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THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S USE OF
INTERNATIONAL SWAP LINES
Colleen Baker*
This Article focuses on the U.S. Federal Reserve's controversial practice of
loaning U.S. dollars to foreign central banks, which the foreign central banks then
turn around and loan to institutions in their jurisdictions. The Federal Reserve
does not know the identity of these recipient institutions. Nevertheless, these
loans-termed "swap lines"-provide foreign financial institutions the type of
financial stability that the U.S. Federal Reserve was created to provide for U.S.
banks during times of crises. During the financial crisis, the U.S. Federal Reserve
arranged swap lines with 14 foreign central banks for a total amount of $583
billion, making it the de facto international lender of last resort. In December
2012, the U.S. Federal Reserve once again extended the duration of its swap line
function.
In this Article, I argue that because of U.S. dollar dependencies and stability risks
in global financial markets, and because of the global financial markets'
dependency on the U.S. dollar, an international dollar lender of last resort is
needed. The U.S. Federal Reserve is currently the institution best positioned to fill
this role. Yet, I also argue that because of the potential problems, risks, and costs
of this role, the U.S. Federal Reserve's swap line function must be rethought. The
U.S. Federal Reserve's swap line authority relies upon an interpretation of
statutory provisions in the Federal Reserve Act dating back to its origins in 1913.
The institutional structure of today's global, interconnected financial markets
bears little resemblance to that existing in 1913. This has left the swap line
function open to undue problems and risks and allows for the possibility of
problematic future overseas expansions.
* Associate Professor University of Notre Dame Law School. Ph.D. The
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, JD/MBA University of Virginia. I wish to
thank Matthew Barrett, Anthony J. Bellia, Adam Feibelman, Anna Gelpern, Michael
Kirsch, Paul Mahoney, Geoffrey Miller, John Nagle, Patricia O'Hara, Katharina Pistor,
David Skeel, Julian Velasco, Art Wilmarth, David Zaring and participants in faculty
colloquia at Notre Dame Law School and Northwestern Law School in addition to
participants in the Joint Program of the Securities Regulation and Financial
Institutions/Consumer Financial Services Section at the Annual Meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools in January 2013 for their helpful comments.
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Accordingly, my Article proposes a new, distinct framework for the U.S. Federal
Reserve's swap lines. The first prong of this framework provides for a new market
stability role for the U.S. Federal Reserve and provides for significant flexibility in
its emergency lending operations. The second prong of this framework provides
boundaries for this new flexibility, including limiting future extensions of the swap
lines and bolstering democratic accountability in their use.
Rethinking the U.S Federal Reserve's swap line function is an urgent task. Central
bank swap lines are set to become key structural and competitive features of
global financial markets. The recent establishment of a bilateral swap line between
the People's Bank of China and the Bank of England and discussion of a swap line
between the People's Bank of China and the Bank of France to promote London
and Paris as offshore renminbi trading centers attest to this fact. In sum, this
Article argues that the use of swap lines can be a significant aid in enabling the
Federal Reserve to act as the international dollar lender of last resort-and,
thereby, foster domestic and international financial market stability-but that this
public objective cannot be reached unless the swap lines themselves are grounded
in a thoughtful, practical, and forward-looking legalframework.
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INTRODUCTION
"Always define every issue as just a technical problem."'
New York and London compete to be the leading center of global
finance. The Bank of England (the United Kingdom's central bank) recently
became the first major central bank to enter a currency agreement with the
2People's Bank of China. Recent news reports state that the Bank of France
(France's central bank) likewise plans to implement a currency agreement with the
People's Bank of China.3 Paris is another of London's financial center
competitors. Such currency agreements promote China's "currency swap
diplomacy."4 They also promote London and Paris as offshore financial trading
centers for renminbi, China's currency. In a crisis, these agreements would enable
the Bank of England or the Bank of France to borrow renminbi directly from the
People's Bank of China, then turn around and lend it to financial institutions in the
United Kingdom or France, respectively. Accordingly, these agreements would act
as a public insurance6 mechanism and lower the risks involved for financial
1. John Dizard, A "Squall in the Fall" over Dollars for Europe, FIN. TIMES,
June 24, 2012, at 7 (quoting Wilson Paul Dizard).
2. See Josh Noble, UK and China Establish Currency Swap Line, FIN. TIMES
(Jun. 23, 2013, 8:14 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c063da4c-dbcc-11e2-8853-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2cplwfEX1.
3. See Langi Chiang & Ben Blanchard, France Plans Currency Swap Line with
China: Paper, REUTERS (Apr. 12, 2013, 11:44 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04
/13/us-china-france-currency-idUSBRE9 3C01S20130413.
4. See generally Joe Leahy, Brazil and China Agree Currency Swap, FIN. TIMES
(Mar. 26, 2013, 5:12 PM) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3e2O3O2e-9632-11e2-9ab2-
00144feabdcO.html#axzz2YgfW8tqp (discussing Brazil and China's planned currency swap
as promoting China's "currency swap diplomacy"); UK, China RMB Swap Line Could Be
World's Largest at CNY450 Billion, ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://mib.rbs.com/insight/currency-conundrum/uk-china-rmb-swap-line-could-be-worlds-
largest-at-cny450-billion (recognizing that China has 19 existing bilateral swap lines)
[hereinafter UK, China RMB Swapline].
5. Such swap lines would promote trade and investment. See Leahy, supra note
4. The U.K/China swap line is predicted to be the largest renminbi swap line in the world.
See UK, China RMB Swapline, supra note 4. A new-London based clearinghouse, London
Metal Exchange Clear, is planning to clear renminbi-denominated products beginning in
2014. See Phillip Stafford, LME Sets Date for Clearing House Launch, FIN. TIMES
(Jun. 5, 2013, 1:16 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4db6d330-cdcd-11e2-al3e-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2YgfW8tqp. Such financial market infrastructure developments
are likely to depend upon the possibility of emergency liquidity assistance from a renminbi
swap line.
6. See generally Alice Ross, BoE Urged to Support Renminbi Trading, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:41 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/df40d7dc-3d69-11e2-
b8b200l44feabdcO.html#axzz2Yg fW8tqp ("A swap line would be an insurance policy.").
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institutions in trading renminbi. To compete with London and Paris, financial
institutions in New York would undoubtedly lobby for a similar currency
agreement between the Federal Reserve, the U.S. central bank, and the People's
Bank of China. Such agreements are controversial, and, although unknown by
most, the Federal Reserve already has several of these controversial7 central bank
currency agreements in place.8 Unfortunately, the current statutory framework
supporting such agreements is antiquated and inadequate to address the realities of
today's global financial marketplace. This Article theorizes a new legal framework
for the Federal Reserve's current and future bilateral9 currency agreements with
foreign central banks.
The task of creating and implementing a new bilateral framework is
urgent. Central bank currency agreements are becoming key structural and
competitive features of global financial markets. The controversy surrounding the
Federal Reserve's currency agreements with foreign central banks is vividly
illustrated by a July 2009 congressional hearing during which Congressman Alan
Grayson asked Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke: "So who got the
money?"' 0 Congressman Grayson was asking for the identity of the ultimate
recipients of over half a trillion dollars in loans" from the Federal Reserve to 14
foreign central banks via its currency agreements. The Chairman responded: "I
don't know."12 Chairman Bernanke explained to the Congressman that these dollar
loans went to "financial institutions in Europe and other countries"1 3 to quiet
global financial market instabilities. But as to exactly "which ones," he did not
7. For example, these currency agreements have incited accusations of an
ongoing bailout of the European Monetary System. See Federal Reserve Aid to the
Eurozone: Its Impact on the U.S. and the Dollar: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic and Monetary Policy and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv. H. R., 112th Cong.
112 111 (2012) (statement of Rep. Ron Paul) [hereinafter Hearing]; see also Gerald P.
O'Driscoll, Jr., The Federal Reserve's Covert Bailout of Europe, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 28,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204464404577118682763082876.h
tml. But at the same time, these currency agreements have also engendered demands that
the Federal Reserve "must save the world." See MARKETBEAT, Drumbeat's Getting Louder:
The Fed Must Save the World, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (June 6, 2012, 3:27 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2012/06/06/drumbeats-getting-louder-the-fed-must-save-
the-world/.
8. See generally Kristina Peterson, Fed Swaps Continue for Foreign Lenders,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2012, at All.
9. In theory, a multilateral, multicurrency settlement arrangement among
international central banks could replace bilateral currency agreement arrangements.
10. CSPAN, Alan Grayson: "Which Foreigners Got the Fed's
$5,000,000,000,000?" Bernanke:"I Don't Know," YouTUBE, (Jul. 21, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nONYBTkE1yQ/.
11. Whether the swap lines are properly termed "loans" is subject to dispute. On
the Federal Reserve's balance sheet, "central bank liquidity swaps," are listed under
"Reserve Bank credit." See Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, FED. RESERVE (July 11,
2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h41/current/h41.htm; see also CSPAN, supra
note 10 ("The loans go to the central banks.").
12. CSPAN, supra note 10.
13. Id.
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know,14 because the foreign central banks then turned around and lent the dollars
to institutions within their jurisdictions.
These bilateral central bank currency agreements are potentially
problematic. In good times, they stand ready as potential public insurance
mechanisms and thereby help to promote the growth of financial institution trading
activities. In financial crises, they can help stabilize market disruptions to which
their very presence could paradoxically contribute. For example, renminbi
shortages are not causing market disruptions and threatening to destabilize
financial institutions in London or New York. But as offshore renminbi trading
centers develop, such shortages and related market instability could occur in the
future. Nevertheless, these stability-oriented, yet potentially destabilizing bilateral
currency agreements-officially termed "central bank liquidity swaps," or "swap
lines" for short-are becoming critical components of economists' widespread
"rethinking [of] central banking" 5 post financial crisis.
By the late 1990s, the Federal Reserve had largely ceased' 6 using its swap
lines because of concerns about their potential negative impact on Federal Reserve
policy credibility.17 But during the height of the financial crisis in October 2008,
the Federal Reserve resurrected its swap lines with a vengeance. It also used these
bilateral agreements in a largely new way. Swap lines became mechanisms to
outsource the Federal Reserve's bedrock power-its lender of last resort role-to
foreign central banks. The Federal Reserve's expansive use of swap lines during
the financial crisis constituted "an unprecedented delegation of the Fed's powers to
foreign policy makers."" This significant global delegation aimed to ensure the
smooth functioning of international settlement systems, which are part of the
14. Id.; see also Scott Lanman & Bradley Keoun, No One Telling Who Took
$586 Billion in Swaps with Fed Condoning Anonymity, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-1 1/no-one-says-who-took-586-billion-in-fed-
swaps-done-in-anonymity.html.
15. See THE CoMM. ON INT'L ECoN. POLICY AND REFORM, Rethinking Central
Banking, BROOKINGS (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/
Reports/2011/9/ciepr%20central%20banking/Rethinking%20Central%20Banking.PDF
[Hereinafter Rethinking].
16. During this interim period, the Federal Reserve had swap lines in place with
the central banks of Canada and Mexico as part of the North American Framework
Agreement of 1994. See Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee April 30, 2008,
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypol
icy/fomcminutes20080430.htm.
17. See Michael D. Bordo, Owen F. Humpage & Anna Schwartz, U.S. Foreign-
Echange-Market Intervention During the Volcker-Greenspan Era 41 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 16345, 2010) ("In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the FOMC
objected to the frequent and heavy interventions then underway, primarily because they
threatened monetary policy credibility, not because they rarely worked. Their decision to
abandon foreign-exchange operations was a wise one.").
18. Maurice Obstfeld, Lenders of Last Resort and Global Liquidity: Rethinking
the System, DEV. OUTREACH, Dec. 2009, at 44.
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background "plumbing" of global financial markets19 and are an important
potential source of systemic risk. These systems facilitate the "money flows" 2 0
involved in global trade, whether of goods, services, or financial assets. 2 ' As the
international currency, the U.S. dollar plays a critical role in the stability of these
global money flows. Thus, the Federal Reserve's creation of swap lines with 14
foreign central banks during the financial crisis aimed to stabilize disruptions to
these essential systems.
Many economists have concluded that the Federal Reserve's swap lines
22
aided in stabilizing markets during the recent financial crisis. But the swap lines
also played a critical role in the expansion of the Federal Reserve's balance sheet
and contribute to its expansion even today. Prior to the financial crisis, the Federal
Reserve's balance sheet assets numbered around $843 billion,2 3 but this number
now exceeds $3 trillion.4 In 2008, the swap lines peaked at $583 billion, or about
one-fourth25 of the Federal Reserve's assets. In February 2012, this amount stood
at $109 billion. With significant swap line amounts still outstanding,2 6 it would be
reasonable to assume that the Federal Reserve relies upon an emergency legal
authority to activate these loans. But it does not. Nor does it seek Congressional
19. Payment systems are international financial systems that settle obligations
among financial institutions. Risks to the functioning of these systems likely "pose[] the
greatest systemic risk." HEIDI MANDANIS SCHOONER & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, GLOBAL
BANK REGULATION xvii (2010).
20. Perry Mehrling, Essential Hybridity: A Money View of FX, J OF COMP.
ECON., Mar. 20, 2013, at 3.
21. See generally David L. Mengle, Behind the Money Market: Clearing and
Settling Money Market Instruments, in ECON. REV., Sept. Oct. 1992, at 3.
22. See generally Darrell Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial System - Uneven
Progress, INT'L J. OF CENT. BANKING, Jan. 2013, at 251-79; EMMANUEL FARHI, PIERRE-
OLIVIER GOURINCHAS & HELENE REY, REFORMING THE INT'L MONETARY Sys. 36 (2011); see
also Michael D. Bordo, Owen F. Humpage & Anna Schwartz, Epilogue: Foreign-Exch.-
Market Operations in the Twenty-First Century 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17984, 2012); Patrick McGuire & Gotz van Peter, The US Dollar
Shortage in Global Banking and the International Policy Response (Bank for Int'l
Settlements Working Paper No. 291, 2009); Naohiko Baba & Frank Packer, From Turmoil
to Crisis: Dislocations in the FX Swap Market Before and After the Failure of Lehman
Bros. 6-7 (Bank of Int'l Settlements Working Paper, No. 285, 2009); William A. Allen &
Richhild Moessner, Central Bank Co-operation and International Liquidity in the Financial
Crisis of 2008-9 8-22 (Bank for Int'l Settlements Working Paper, No. 310, 2010); Elizabeth
A. Duke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Syst., Address at the Center for Latin American Monetary
Studies 60th Anniversary Conference (Jul. 20, 2012), in CENT. BANK COOPERATION IN
TIMES OF CRISIS at 4 (Jul. 20, 2012).
23. See Obstfeld, supra note 18, at 43.
24. See Factors Affecting Reserve Balances, supra note 11, for comments
regarding the Federal Reserve's balance sheet.
25. Michael J. Fleming & Nicholas J. Klagge, The Fed. Reserve's Foreign Exch.
Swap Lines, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN., Apr. 2010, at 1, 5.
26. See Federal Exchange Foreign Swap Agreements, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/fxswap/fxswap.cfm (last visited Sept. 10, 2013,
4:31 PM).
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approval for these loans. The Federal Reserve's autonomy is in stark contrast to
the authority of the U.S. Treasury, whose emergency appeal to Congress for $700
billion was initially rejected, but subsequently accepted, as the financial crisis
escalated in October 2008.27
Although "not . . . a penny"2 8 has been lost on the swap lines,2 9 this
extensive delegation of the central bank's lender of last resort role creates
significant problems and risks. Central banks' authority ultimately rests upon their
legal construction. Therefore, this Article argues that because of their potential
problems, risks, and public costs, the Federal Reserve's swap line framework must
be rethought.3 0 The increasingly common use of the swap lines3' itself is
problematic. Swap lines can make central banks significant players in foreign
currency markets.3 2 As lenders of last resort, central banks could influence
exchange rates, replacing otherwise free-market determinations.3 3 Central bank
determination of exchange rates risks the integrity of the market pricing
mechanism in foreign exchange markets-the largest of all financial markets-
which would then impact all others.3 4 Significant swap line use could possibly
27. Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act on October 3,
2008, which included $700 billion to assist financial institutions. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY
W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE ACTIVITIES 64 (4th ed. 2010).
28. See Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of Dr. Steven B. Kamin, Director, Div.
of Int'l Fin. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys).
29. A foreign central bank has not defaulted on its swap line obligations to the
Federal Reserve. But this cost consideration alone does not include the total potential costs
that could result from swap line use. For example, it does not include the potential
depreciation of the dollar as a result of the added global supply of dollars by the swap lines
or the total social cost of global financial market instability and crises, to which the swap
lines could contribute.
30. Some economists have also supported the rethinking of the Federal
Reserve's statutory frameworks. See BENN STEIL & MANUEL HINDS, MONEY, MKTS. &
SOVEREIGNTY 246 (2009) ("The best hope for salvaging financial globalization, then, is a
renewed statutory framework for the Fed, one which explicitly acknowledges the global role
of the dollar and the dependence of the U.S. economy on foreign confidence in it.").
31. The Federal Reserve's swap lines have been in place since May 2010.
European Central Bank policy makers have called for "considering a framework of
permanent stand-by swap lines" among "the world's major central banks to stabilize
financial markets." Eva Kuehnen, ECB's Coeure Calls for Permanent Currency Swap
Lines, REUTERS (May 11, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/05/1 1/uk-ecb-
coeure-idUKBRE84AOVS20120511. Economists have also suggested the possibility of
institutionalizing swap line networks. See generally Allen & Moessner, supra note 22, at 78.
32. See generally Mehrling, supra note 20 (explaining the role of central banks
as "dealers of last resort" in foreign currency markets).
33. Id. (explaining that when central banks act as "dealers of last resort," the
interest rates at which currencies are bought or sold could be policy rather than market
rates).
34. JAMES RICKARDS, CURRENCY WARS 258 (2011) ("The dollar, for all its faults
and weaknesses, is the pivot of the entire global system of currencies, stocks, bonds,
derivatives and investments of all kinds.").
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even add to global currency tensionS35 and related talk of "currency wars."36
Finally, the use of the swap lines is vulnerable to interest group capture.3 7 Foreign
currency trading "is increasingly concentrated in the hands of relatively few
banks."3 8
The legal authority for the Federal Reserve's swap lines is antiquated and
woefully inadequate to confront these challenges. It relies largely upon an
interpretation of statutory provisions in the Federal Reserve Act dating from the
Act's enactment in 1913. These provisions are primarily focused on market
activities with private actors, but the current swap lines are with public actors. 3 9 In
spite of these inadequacies, Congress's momentous reform of the U.S. financial
system with the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act40
barely addressed the Federal Reserve's swap line function.4 '
To my knowledge, this is the first law review article to offer a theoretical
42
analysis of the Federal Reserve's swap lines. Because of the preeminent
international role of the U.S. dollar, I argue that the Federal Reserve should act as
the international dollar lender of last resort until the advent of a truly global
solution. At the same time, I also argue that rethinking the swap lines' legal
framework is urgent. Therefore, informed by Professor Katharina Pistor's legal
35. See generally id.; Tatsuo Ito & William Mallard, Global Currency Tensions
Rise, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 23, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324660
404578198133815561080.html; Alice Ross, Yen Tipped to Underperform This Year, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2013, at 18.
36. See generally Nicholas Hastings, The Dollar Will Lose the Currency War
Now, and Appreciate, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424127887323539804578261371487786486.html; Michael Steen & Alice Ross,
Warning on New Currency War, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, at 6; Robin Harding & Alice
Ross, G20 Braced for Currency War Talks, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2013, at 7; but see Philipp
Hildebrand, Opinion, No Such Thing as a Global Currency War, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2013,
at 9.
37. See generally Lingling Wei & Jessica Mead, U.K. Banks Push for Yuan
Swap, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230445
9804577284882288529456.html; BoE Urged to Support Renminbi Trading, supra note 6.
38. Gabriele Galati, Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Markets and CLS
Bank, BIS Q. REv., Dec. 2002, at 55, 58.
39. In Part V, infra, I argue that the swap lines could also be extended to
overseas non-governmental third parties.
40. Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act [hereinafter,
Dodd-Frank], Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections
within Tiles 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 42 of the United States Code).
41. Dodd Frank merely mandates that the swap lines be included both in a
required GAO audit of and website publication of Federal Reserve lending during the
financial crisis. See id. § 1109.
42. Several law review articles mention the Federal Reserve's swap lines. See,
e.g., Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation, 89 N.C.
L. REv. 1579, 1621 (2011). I am unaware of one that provides a theoretical analysis of this
subject.
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theory of finance,4 3 my Article conceptualizes an innovative, distinct, two-prong
legal framework for the Federal Reserve's swap lines.
My proposed framework calls for a distinct statutory setting for the swap
lines to acknowledge the unique nature of lending arrangements between the
Federal Reserve and foreign central banks. A distinct statutory setting will also
begin to create the legal frameworks necessary to support the increasing
cooperation between the Federal Reserve and foreign central banks. Within this
setting, the first prong of my framework provides both for the swap lines to be an
explicit central bank emergency authority and for the Federal Reserve to be
designated as the market stability regulator. This first prong ensures significant
"elasticity"4 for the Federal Reserve to act as an international dollar lender of last
resort. But the very idea of elasticity implies an outer boundary. And democratic
considerations require limits on central banks' power.4 5 Therefore, the second
prong of my framework creates mechanisms for limiting this flexibility. These
include measures to minimize moral hazard, increase central bank accountability,
strengthen collateral security, and restrict expansion of the swap lines.
In sum, my framework acknowledges the critical role of the Federal
Reserve's swap lines in the global financial marketplace. But it also acknowledges
that the Federal Reserve's bilateral swap lines are much more than just a technical
banking issue. Part I introduces the problem of international financial market
instability and the critical role of the U.S. dollar in global financial markets. Part II
analyzes the idea of an international lender of last resort and swap lines, including
the recently transformed purpose of their use and the antiquated statutory
provisions upon which their legal authority relies. Part III briefly describes well-
known problems with the swap lines, but then also identifies even more
fundamental problems and risks that scholars and public officials have overlooked.
In Part IV, I explore the public policy objectives that the swap lines should
promote. These objectives then motivate my rethinking of the swap line's legal
framework.
I. GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE U.S. DOLLAR
In this Part, I explain the developments in global banking and financial
markets that have led to a renewed focus on the need for an international lender of
last resort. This Part then examines the idea of an international lender of last resort.
43. Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. COMP. EcoN. 2 (2013).
44. See id. at 16 ( "The elasticity of law can be defined as the probability that ex-
ante legal commitments will be relaxed or suspended in the future.").
45. Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, has stated:
Central bank independence is essential, but, as I have noted, it cannot be
unconditional. Democratic principles demand that, as an agent of the
government, a central bank must be accountable in the pursuit of its
mandated goals, responsive to the public and its elected representatives,
and transparent in its policies.
Benjamin Bernanke, Address at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies
International Conference (May 25, 2010).
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 55:603
It concludes by arguing that the Federal Reserve is the most suitable candidate for
this task until the advent of a truly global liquidity solution.
A. The Dollar as the International Currency
1. In General
The U.S. dollar is the international currency and the main international
reserve currency.4 6 Consequently, the dollar plays a critical role both in the
settlement of global trade-whether of goods, services, or financial assets-and in
many countries' exchange rate regimes.4 7 Although financial markets are
increasingly globalized, "[by] many measures, the US dollar continues to dominate
the international monetary system." 48 The Federal Reserve's swap lines have likely
even increased international demand for the dollar. 4 9 For now, the dollar remains
king.o
The United States' international strength is due in large part to the global
role of the dollar, which provides incomparable strategic advantages to the United
States. It is an "exorbitant privilege."5' For example, the prominence of the dollar
"reduces US transaction costs for goods and financial trades, and it also helps
absorb some external shocks to the US economy . . ., reduces the currency risk
associated with investment decisions[,] . . . [and] helps to finance the external
deficits of the United States."5 2 Safeguarding the dollar's value and promoting its
international role should be a critical public policy objective.
2. The Dollar in Global Financial Markets
Not surprisingly, as the "de facto international currency," 5 3 the dollar and
its creator-the Federal Reserve-play a unique role in the international monetary
system. When the Federal Reserve creates dollars, it is creating money that acts
46. The dollar constituted approximately 60% of world currency reserves in
2010. See FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 7. Reserve currencies are financial assets
international central banks hold in reserve because they are considered to be safe and liquid
holdings. See generally id. at 28.
47. See id. at 9.
48. See id. at 7. Hyoung-kyu Chey argues that political motivations involving the
U.S.'s influence in the international monetary system were a possible motivation for the
Federal Reserve's extensive use of swap lines during the financial crisis. Hyoung-Kyu
Chey, The Fed Swap Lines and the Global Lender of Last Resort: The Politics of
International Monetary Relations (Aug. 29, 2013) (unpublished paper, Am. Political Sci.
Ass'n.) (on file with author).
49. See Allen & Moesser, supra note 22, at 75.
50. Francesco Guerrera, The Dollar Is Still King, for Now, WALL ST. J., Nov. 6,
2012, at C1.
51. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, ExORBITANT PRIVILEGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF
THE DOLLAR AND THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 4 (2012).
52. FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 10.
53. STEIL & HINDS, supra note 30, at 234.
612
2013] SWAP LINES 613
both as the U.S. domestic currency and the most important international
54
currency.
The dollar "underpins the global banking system as the funding currency
for global banks."55 Although one of the world's largest debtors, the United States
is actually "a substantial net creditor in the global banking system."5 6 Global banks
have increasingly structured their balance sheets to rely heavily upon short-term
dollar funding to finance their longer-term, dollar-denominated assets.5 7 Arguably,
"[t]he funding difficulties which arose during the crisis are directly linked to the
remarkable expansion in banks' global balance sheets over the past decade."5' This
expansion was in excess of general economic expansion. 5 9 For example, in 2003,
the U.S. dollar assets of European banks stood at approximately $4 trillion, and
this amount doubled by 2007.60 As the crisis erupted, European banks reportedly
depended upon approximately $1-2.2 trillion in short-term dollar funding.61
International financial institutions' choice to expand their balance sheet
holdings of dollar-denominated assets and to rely heavily upon short-term dollar
funding to finance these assets has had important consequences for international
financial market stability. Unlike U.S. banks, European banks-and other dollar-
dependent international financial institutions-do not have large deposit bases that
provide stable sources of dollar funding to finance their dollar-denominated
assets. 62 Instead, such institutions access dollars by borrowing them, borrowing
Euros (or the relevant domestic currency) and converting them to dollars on spot
foreign currency markets, or by using foreign currency swaps to change Euros (or
the relevant domestic currency) into dollars.63 These market mechanisms to access
dollars generally function seamlessly. In financial crises, however, these avenues
of dollar access can experience critical disruptions. Such disruptions are highly
problematic for international financial institutions, which rely heavily upon routine
access to short-term funding in a foreign currency, such as the dollar. These
funding disruptions threaten the stability of international banks and financial
54. See id. at 225, 239 (suggesting that "[t]here is today, therefore, as in the past,
a clear and dangerous conflict between the needs of the international monetary system and
the application of monetary sovereignty," and that "globalization and monetary sovereignty
are incompatible").
55. Rethinking, supra note 15, at 14.
56. Id. at 20.
57. Foreign banks make significant U.S. dollar loans. William Dudley, President
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, estimates this figure to be approximately $700
billion. Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of William C. Dudley, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.).
58. See McGuire & von Peter, supra note 22, at 1.
59. See generally id. The authors also note that "[t]he outstanding stock of
banks' foreign claims grew from $10 trillion at the beginning of 2000 to $34 trillion by end-
2007." Id. at 9.
60. See Obstfeld, supra note 18, at 44.
61. See GALINA ALEXEENKO, SANDRA KOLLEN & CHARLES DAVIDSON, SWAP
LINES UNDERSCORE THE DOLLAR'S GLOBAL ROLE 22 23 (ECONSOUTH eds. 1st Qtr. 2012).
62. See Fleming & Klagge, supra note 25, at 2.
63. See McGuire & von Peter, supra note 22, at 3.
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institutions relying upon short-term funding, which in turn threatens systemic
collapses (as happened in the financial crisis) not only in the institutions' own
countries, but also overseas-such as in the United States.
3. The Fragility of International Banking
Why are disruptions to international banks and financial institutions'
access to short-term dollar funding so problematic? Traditional banks and similarly
structured financial institutions engage in what is known as "maturity
transformation," which is the use of short-term liabilities-such as demand
deposits or repurchase agreements ("repos")-to finance long-term assets such as
traditional mortgages and other types of multi-year financial contracts. Maturity
transformation is a core concept of banking 65 and creates an inherent fragility at
banking's structural core. A bank's creditors-such as its demand account
depositors or its repo lenders66 -by contract can demand the return of their funds
on very short notice. Such creditor withdrawals often occur because creditors
begin to lose confidence in the bank's financial robustness. 67 Creditors could be
concerned about the quality of the bank's assets or even its management. When a
bank's creditors en masse demand the return of their funds, a bank run occurs and
liquidity problems, which could quickly become solvency problems, ensue.
Banks invest the vast majority of the funds they borrow and keep only a
fraction of these funds on hand at the bank. An important source of bank profits is
the difference between the price a bank has to pay for the use of funds-the
interest rate of the money it borrows-and the price it charges on the longer-term
investment of those funds-the interest rate it charges borrowers. Yet a bank's
borrowing and investment practices create a time (or "maturity") mismatch
between its short-term liabilities and longer-term assets. Therefore, widespread
short-term creditor demands for the return of their funds create at least two
problems. First, a bank could need external assistance to comply with such
demands because the majority of these funds are likely invested in longer-term
assets. But other financial institutions-who could also be among the bank's
withdrawing creditors-might be unwilling to help. They, too, could lack
confidence in the bank's solvency. Second, a bank will be unable to access the
64. Repurchase agreements are essentially short-term secured lending
agreements.
65. Professor Gary Gorton defines banking as "creating short term trading or
transaction securities [such as demand deposits] backed by longer term assets." Gary B.
Gorton, Questions and Answers About the Financial Crisis: Prepared for the U.S. Financial
Crisis Inquiry Commission (Feb. 20, 2010) (unpublished report) (on file with U.S. Fin.
Crisis Inquiry Comm.).
66. The proximate trigger of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns's collapses
resulted from lost access to large amounts of short-term funding. See generally Gary B.
Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo 4-5 (Yale ICF,
Working Paper No. 09-14, 2010).
67. In the case of a demand deposit, the account holder can demand the
immediate return of her funds. Most repo loans last only for an overnight period. The repo
lender has no obligation to renew or "rollover" the loan.
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short-term funding it depends upon to operate and could become insolvent. In such
circumstances, the bank's only hope might be to borrow from the central bank, the
lender of last resort. Bank runs and panics threaten not only the collapse of an
individual institution, but also systemic collapses. Creditors' concerns about one
institution's solvency can quickly spread via contagion to other banks and
financial institutions. The purpose of a lender of last resort is to stabilize financial
markets through emergency lending before widespread contagion and collapses
occur.
International banks and financial institutions are similarly vulnerable to
international runs and panics. However, international bank runs are potentially
more devastating than domestic ones. International funding fleeing banks or
financial institutions is a foreign currency. The banks' and financial institutions'
home country central bank cannot create this currency and then lend it to them in
its traditional role as the lender of last resort.68 International banks and financial
institutions are increasingly relying upon short-term funding denominated in a
foreign currency such as the dollar. For this reason, many problems once thought
relevant only for economically emerging markets-such as "runs" by short term
international lenders69 -are now confronting financial institutions in industrialized
countries.
Without access to funding liquidity 70 in the requisite currency, banking
and financial institutions risk having to conduct fire sales of their assets to
68. Economists explain that:
"when foreign funding of the banking sector evaporates
abruptly, the consequences are more damaging. If the local bank
is leveraged and debt is denominated in dollars, then outflows
can set off the well-known cycle of distress in which belated
attempts by banks to hedge their dollar exposure drives down
the value of the local currency, making the dollar-denominated
debt even larger."
Rethinking, supra note 15, at 11.
69. See generally Frederic S. Mishkin, Lessons from the Asian Crisis, 18 J. INT'L
MONEY AND FIN. 709 723 (1999); JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, INTERNATIONAL LENDER OF LAST
RESORT (June 25, 1999) (report prepared for Rethinking the Int'l Monetary Sys.) (on file
with Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston) (citing JEFFERY A. FRANKEL, THE ASIAN MODEL, THE
MIRACLE, THE CRISIS AND THE FUND, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISES AND REFORMS: CASES
AND CAVEATS 319, 326 (B. N. Ghosh ed., 2001) ("Statistical tests show that the percentage
of capital inflows that are bank loans, especially short-term or floating rate loans
denominated in foreign currency, has a statistically significant effect on the probability of a
currency crisis . . . ."); see also NOURIEL ROUBINI & STEPHEN MIHM, CRISIS ECONOMICS: A
CRASH COURSE IN THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 150 (2010) (noting that in the financial crisis,
industrialized countries faced liquidity challenges similar to those that have confronted
economically emerging markets in past financial crises).
70. Funding liquidity is the ability "to attract external finance at short notice,
subject to low transaction costs and at a financial cost that reflects the [institution's]
fundamental solvency." WLLEM H. BUITER, CENTRAL BANKS AND FINANCIAL CRISIS 16
(Aug. 16, 2008) (report prepared for Fed. Reserve Bank of Kansas City's symposium on
"Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System") (on file with Fed. Reserve Bank of
Kansas City).
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maintain their balance sheet equilibrium. Such fire sales risk turning a financial
institution's liquidity problem into a solvency problem if these assets can be sold
only at heavily discounted prices. These fire sales in turn risk the collapse of other
financial institutions, which then have to write down the value of similar assets on
their balance sheets. To prevent such instability and potential systemic collapse,
governments around the world put public safety mechanisms into place. In the
United States, a "federal safety net" consisting of federal deposit insurance,
FedWire, 71 and the Federal Reserve's credit and liquidity facilities, which includes
its traditional lender of last resort role, exists for precisely such circumstances. As
an overseas extension of the Federal Reserve's lender of last resort function, the
swap lines expand the coverage of the federal safety net.
4. The Federal Reserve's Last Resort Liquidity Provision
Central banks' lender of last resort role is designed to provide emergency
funding liquidity to manage any systemic instability created by the inherently
fragile financial structure of banking activity. The Federal Reserve can act as a
lender of last resort either through its open market operations or through its
'72discount window lending facility. A lender of last resort provides stability to
banks and to the financial system in two ways. First, if a solvent bank is
experiencing a liquidity problem, the central bank's emergency funds should
prevent a temporary illiquidity issue from becoming a solvency issue if a bank is
forced to conduct asset fire sales. Second, a lender of last resort tries to prevent the
potential systemic contagion that a bank run on a single institution could trigger.
Lenders of last resort are focused on preventing macro instability.7 3
To perform the lender of last resort role, a central bank must be able to
create currency reserves, take quick action, and effectively communicate its
objectives and procedures to financial markets.74 Therefore, lenders of last resort
should have defined lending protocols. 7 5 They should provide only short-term
intervention 7 6 in order to aid temporarily illiquid, not insolvent, institutions. The
provision of financial stability to insolvent banks risks propping up insolvent
71. FedWire is a settlement mechanism providing transaction finality, meaning
once payments are made, they are final. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF NY, SETTLEMENT
LIQUIDITY AND MONETARY POLICY IMPLEMENTATION LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
7 (March 2012).
72. See Thomas M. Humphrey, Arresting Financial Crises: The Fed Versus the
Classicals 4 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 751, 2013).
73. See J. EcON. COMM., 106TH CONG., AN INTERNATIONAL LENDER OF LAST
RESORT, THE IMF, AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE 1-2 (1999) (Report by Jim Saxton).
74. See id.
75. Some economists have criticized the Federal Reserve for not having a clear
last resort lending protocol, arguing that financial market uncertainty, incentives for
political solutions, and greater risk taking from past bailouts are potential consequences of
such shortfall. See 2 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, BK. 2:
1970-1986 1248-49 (2009).
76. See J. ECON. COMM., supra note 73, at 2.
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institutions, the assumption of fiscal roles by central banks, 7 7 heavy public clean-
up costs, 78 and a distortion of market discipline and pricing.
The presence of a lender or market-maker of last resort79-indeed of the
federal safety net for banks, financial institutions, and markets-creates a
significant moral hazard problem. The problem of moral hazard refers to the
economic incentive created for individuals and institutions to increase the risk of
their activities when a third-party insurer is present. The individuals or institutions
privately benefit from the upside or profits of such activity, but can share the
downside or costs of this activity with the insurer.
Central banks can act as the "market-maker of last resort" in foreign
currency markets when severe disruptions or breakdowns occur.o In normal
market conditions, dealer banks act as market-makers in foreign currency markets,
exchanging one international currency for another. But if such market-making
activity becomes unprofitable because of unusual market conditions, dealer banks
will decrease their market-making activity."' Nevertheless, the smooth functioning
of foreign currency markets depends upon the presence of market-makers to
exchange international currencies. In these circumstances, a central bank can use
swap lines to act as a last resort lender of its currency, thereby increasing
international supply.
77. See generally BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, 82ND ANNUAL REPORT 48
(2012) (noting that "[c]entral banks' balance sheet policies have blurred the line between
monetary and fiscal policy"); see also Todd Buell & David Wessel, BIS Official Warns of
Central Bank Overreach, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 1000
1424052702304782404577486522409217152.html.
78. An example of this would be the losses from the U.S. Savings and Loan
Crisis in the 1980s. See generally Broome & Markham, supra note, 27 at 95-113.
79. Central banks can act as market-makers of last resort by providing a safety
net for financial markets. This role is distinct from central banks' traditional role of
providing a safety net to the traditional banking system as lenders of last resort. Similar to
the lender of last resort role, the market-maker of last resort role creates important problems
and risks because it too acts as a public insurance mechanism. But the market-maker of last
resort role is arguably more worrisome. Opponents of this role argue that the moral hazard
introduced by a market-maker of last resort is particularly problematic because it impacts
market discipline surrounding credit creation activity and ushers central banks into a fiscal
role. Provision of funding liquidity-as opposed to market liquidity-still requires banks
and financial institutions to make market decisions about asset pricing and selection. If
central banks are responsible for pricing a wide variety of private securities in financial
crises, then asset-pricing risks becoming a policy matter rather than one of market
determination. Financial institution solvency itself then risks becoming a matter of
government policy. During the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve acted as the de facto
market-maker of last resort. Dodd Frank's Title VIII has permanently implemented this last
resort role. See Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve As Last Resort, 46 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 69, 77 (2012).
80. See generally Mehrling, supra note 20, at 1.
81 Id.
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Bankers 82 and economists 83 view central bank swap lines as "insurance."
Consequently, the moral hazard concerns associated with a domestic lender of last
resort are exacerbated when applied to international lenders of last resort.8 4 Both
domestically and internationally, the presence of a public safety net incentivizes
banks and financial institutions to take excessive risk because they do not have to
fully internalize the cost of their risk-taking activities. To minimize the moral
hazard created by government safety nets, proper supervision and regulation of the
institutions benefiting from this government assistance is essential.85 The
components of a "well-functioning prudential regulatory and supervisory system
are adequate disclosure and capital requirements, limits on currency mismatch and
connected lending, prompt corrective action, careful monitoring of an institution's
risk-management procedures, close supervision of financial institutions to enforce
compliance with regulations, and sufficient resources and accountability for
supervisors." 86 Unfortunately, however, both industrialized and emerging market
countries frequently confront "strong political forces" opposed to taking necessary
prudential and regulatory measures. 87 And the presence of an international lender
of last resort decreases the incentive for sovereigns benefiting from this
international assistance to apply more stringent prudential and regulatory standards
to their banks and financial institutions.88
II. THE FEDERAL RESERVE'S SWAP LINES
Through the use of its swap lines, the Federal Reserve became the de
facto global lender of last resort during the financial crisis. Increasingly, swap lines
are becoming competitive mechanisms 89 and critical "connectors" 90 within the
broader structure of international settlement systems, the "plumbing" 91 of global
financial markets. In Part IV, I argue that use of these swap-line-central-bank
82. BoE Urged to Support, supra note 6 (quoting an unnamed banker who stated
that "[a renminbi] swap line would be an insurance policy. It's more important now than it
was a year ago").
83. See FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 36 (arguing that "[s]wap agreements are a
more efficient insurance mechanism" than central bank reserves).
84. In Part III, infra, I discuss potential problems and risks associated with the
swap lines.
85. See generally FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 31.
86. Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor Fed. Reserve Sys., Address at the Tenth
Annual International Conference Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago: Systemic Risk and the
International Lender of Last Resort (Sept. 28, 2007).
87. See Frederic S. Mishkin, The International Lender of Last Resort: What Are
the Issues?, in THE WORLD'S NEw FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE: CHALLENGES FOR ECONOMIC
POLICY 291, 304 (Horst Siebert, ed., 2001).
88. See generally id. at 301.
89. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (stating that competition with
London is one incentive behind the Bank of France's plan to enter a currency agreement
with the People's Bank of China).
90. Duffie, supra note 22, at 2.
91. "Plumbing," as Professor Darrell Duffie explains, "is a common metaphor
for institutional elements of the financial system that are fixed in the short run and enable
flows of credit, capital, and financial risk." Supra note 22, at 252
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"connectors" is only in the early stages. Accordingly, this Part discusses the idea
of an international lender of last resort and the Federal Reserve's de facto
assumption of that role through its use of swap lines, explores the mechanics of the
swap lines, and analyzes their legal authority.
A. The Federal Reserve: De Facto International Lender of Last Resort
The purpose of an international lender of last resort is to provide funding
assistance in a global liquidity crisis.92 Although academic literature has
occasionally discussed the idea, 93 currently no such institution exists. Nevertheless,
economists argue that "an essential function that the international monetary system
must satisfy in times of crisis . . . [is] the provision of liquidity" 94 and that "the
need to have institutions devoted to international monetary and financial stability
on a global level has perhaps never been greater."95 Among legal academics,
92. Individual countries can take preventative measures to confront international
bank runs. For example, one option is to "self-insure" against currency liquidity shortages
by the foreign central bank accumulating significant foreign reserves. The path of sovereign
self-insurance is not without potential downsides. Reserve currency accumulations can also
be used to manipulate the value of a domestic currency and to provide a competitive
advantage to a country's exports through "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies. See generally
Steil & Hinds, supra note 30, at 218; see also Samuel Brittan, The Eternal Folly of Beggar-
My-Neighbour Policies, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2013, at 9. While it might be optimal for an
individual central bank to accumulate vast foreign currency reserves, some suggest it could
be collectively inefficient and detrimental to the international monetary system. Such
policies create significant international demand for safe haven assets, which in turn lowers
interest rates, possibly leading to the next financial bubble and then crisis. See FARHI ET AL.,
supra note 22, at 22 29. Many emerging-market countries in Asia selected the self-
insurance path after experiencing severe financial crises in the late 1990s. Steil & Hinds,
supra note 30, at 218 ("[T]he Asian currency crisis of 1997-1998 taught governments that
they needed huge war chests of dollars to ward off potential runs on their domestic
currencies. The alternative, going begging to the IMF and U.S. Treasury in times of crisis, is
now considered politically and economically unacceptable."); see also Obstfeld, supra note
18, at 445; FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 17. Instead of self-insuring in the years preceding
the financial crisis, however, several major foreign central banks with whom the Federal
Reserve set up swap lines had low, and in some cases insufficient, foreign exchange
reserves to address financial emergencies. See Allen & Moesser, supra note 22, at 60.
Without self-insurance, the heavy dependence upon short-term dollar funding by
international financial institutions risks critical funding disruptions and instability that could
have devastating economic impacts. With globally interdependent economies, this
instability risk extends beyond an individual country's borders. The European debt
problems offer an important example of continuing stability risks to the U.S. economy. The
European debt problems have been called "one of the biggest risks to continued expansion"
of the U.S. economy. It is a combination of sovereign debt problems and banking issues.
European banks hold significant amounts of sovereign debt. ALEXEENKO ET AL., supra note
61, at 21.
93. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 69, at 7144; Mishkin, supra note 86; Olivier
Jeanne & Charles Wyplosz, The International Lender of Last Resort: How Large is Large
Enough? 22 23 (IMF, Working Paper No. 01/76, 2001).
94. FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 3.
95. Mishkin, supra note 86.
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Professor Steven Schwarcz has also discussed the idea of an international liquidity
provider of last resort. 96
Potential candidates suggested for such a role have included the
International Monetary Fund,97 major central banks, or a combination of
institutions.98 The Federal Reserve is responsible for the world's most important
reserve currency, the dollar. The dollar is also the main international currency
relied upon by banks, financial institutions, and businesses to conduct their
activities. Therefore, the Federal Reserve is often viewed as the strongest
contender for the role of international lender of last resort until the advent of a
global solution. Indeed, a 1999 Joint Economic Committee Report entitled, An
International Lender of Last Resort, The IMF, and The Federal Reserve99
("Report"), stated that the Federal Reserve "does meet essential requirements of an
international LOLR [lender of last resort]" 00 and that it should "explicitly
recognize this function."' 0'
Similar to a domestic lender of last resort, an international lender of last
resort would need to be able to act rapidly and supply unlimited amounts of the
necessary currency'02 to restore global financial market liquidity, stability, and
confidence.' 03 But an international lender of last resort would also need to address
the moral hazard problems created by its role, ensure appropriate supervision and
regulation,' and "appropriate conditionality" for this assistance.'os As former
Federal Reserve Governor Frederic Mishkin stated: "[A]n international lender of
96. See generally Steven Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 225 (2008)
[hereinafter Systemic Risk]; see also Steven Schwarcz, Keynote Address, Ex Ante Versus
Ex Post Approaches to Financial Regulation, 15 CHAP. L. REv. 257, 263 (2011); Steven
Schwarcz, Keynote Address, The Case for a Market Liquidity Provider of Last Resort, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 339, 348 (2009).
97. The International Monetary Fund ("IMF") is a multilateral organization
composed of 188 countries. Established in 1944 as part of the Bretton Woods Agreement,
its mission is to "foster global monetary cooperation, secure financial stability, facilitate
international trade, promote high employment and sustainable economic growth, and reduce
poverty around the world." About the IMF, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
www.imf.org/external/about.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2013, 5:38 PM). When the IMF was
created, the idea of being an international lender of last resort was "deliberately rejected."
This rejection was due to concerns about excessive currency creation. Keleher, supra note
73, at 5. For a detailed discussion about the law of the IMF, see generally ROSA M. LASTRA,
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INT'L MONETARY STABLITY 371-447 (2006).
98. See Systemic Risk, supra note 96, at 247.
99. J. EcON. COMM, supra note 73, at 178.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 8.
102. See id. at 4-5.
103. See generally Mishkin, supra note 87, at 300-01.
104. See generally Mishkin, supra note 86 (referring to a generalized international
lender of last resort). Some economists, however, suggest that although moral hazard is a
concern, overstating this worry should be avoided. See Frankel, supra note 69.
105. Mishkin, supra note 69, at 714 (referring to a generalized international lender
of last resort); see also Frankel, supra note 69 (arguing that moral hazard problems will
increase without necessary conditionality).
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last resort which does not sufficiently limit these moral hazard problems can
actually make the situation worse."' 06 It could lead to increased international
financial market crisis. The potential hazards of this role must be acknowledged
and proactively addressed. But as I discuss below, although the Federal Reserve's
use of its swap lines has undergone a "metamorphosis," the legal framework
behind its use has not similarly evolved to confront its potential problems, risks,
and costs.
In the face of global dollar shortages and potentially devastating
international economic contagion, the Federal Reserve would undoubtedly be
under intense pressure to "do something," 07 as it did during the financial crisis.'08
This "something" primarily consisted of the Federal Reserve's extensive use of
swap lines with foreign central banks. At their height, the Federal Reserve's
outstanding swap line amounts accounted for one-fourth of its balance sheet assets,
approximately $583 billion.109 Whether a consensus ultimately exists on which
institution should fulfill the role of international lender of last resort, the reality
is-as a Federal Reserve publication states-that "the Federal Reserve effectively
became the international dollar lender of last resort"" 0 during the financial crisis
through its use of swap lines.
106. Mishkin, supra note 69, at 714.
107. One option would be for the Federal Reserve to do nothing in such
circumstances. Nonintervention risks potentially undesirable domestic outcomes. First,
because of the increased demand for U.S. dollars, the value of the dollar would appreciate
with respect to other currencies. A stronger U.S. dollar makes U.S. exports less competitive.
It also makes it more expensive for U.S. financial institutions to obtain dollar funding.
Second, banks and financial institutions-in the United States and abroad dependent upon
dollar funding could engage in asset fire sales to reduce their dollar funding needs. For these
reasons, it seems unlikely that the Federal Reserve would "do nothing" as its recent actions
in the financial crisis suggest.
108. The Federal Reserve can essentially take two paths to provide dollar funding
to overseas institutions. First, it can provide lender of last resort dollar liquidity to the U.S.
branches of foreign banks. Over 160 foreign banks have U.S. branches. One primary
motivation behind these branches is "to raise wholesale dollar funding in capital markets" to
be forwarded to international bank offices. Rethinking, supra note 15, at 20. Some
international, dollar-dependent financial institutions, however, are not banks with access to
Federal Reserve facilities. Or they might be foreign banks without U.S. offices, or their U.S.
offices might have insufficient collateral to secure emergency funds. Note that collateral
requirements generally mandate that such collateral be held in the United States or an
International Central Securities Depository. Examples of the latter are the Euroclear Bank in
Belgium and Clearstream Banking Luxembourg. See Linda S. Goldberg et al., Central Bank
Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs, ECON. POL'Y REV., May 2011, at
15.
109. ALEXEENKO ET AL., supra note 61, at 24.
110. See id. at 23 24. The parallels between the Federal Reserve's swap lines and
one of its domestic financial crisis "last resort" programs, the Term Auction Facility
("TAF"), also illustrates how the Federal Reserve has become an international dollar lender
of last resort through its swap lines. For example, "[t]he structure and functioning of the
reciprocal currency arrangements are intertwined with the TAF in the sense that they would
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 55:603
B. Swap Line Mechanics
Central bank swap lines"' are contracts or coordination mechanisms
among central banks around the world. Central banks, as is true of the currency
they create, are state-market hybrids.112 Swap lines also arguably contain this dual
characteristic. As currently used by the Federal Reserve, swap lines have two
related purposes: first, to relieve global shortages in short-term funding markets for
U.S. dollars, and second, to promote international financial market stability." 3 In a
"dollar liquidity swap line," the Federal Reserve agrees with a foreign central
bank, such as the European Central Bank ("ECB"), to "swap" a certain amount of
dollars for the foreign central bank's national currency, in this case, U.S. dollars
swapped for Euros. The Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC") authorizes
the swap lines. Acting as the FOMC's agent, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York is responsible for swap line implementation.
The Federal Reserve's swap lines are contracts. 114 For example, the U.S.
Dollar-Euro Swap Agreement Dated As of May 10, 2010, is a seven-page
contract, and, to date, the parties have amended it four times. 115 Although termed a
"swap," the two-part swap line transaction is, in economic substance, a secured
loan.116 The respective currencies are exchanged at a set price. Swap lines can use
facilitate the extension of term dollar liquidity but this time to banks in overseas
jurisdictions." Goldberg et al., supra note 108, at 13.
111. Note that the Federal Reserve has entered into both "dollar liquidity swap
line" and "foreign-currency liquidity swap line" arrangements. This Article focuses on the
former because the latter has not been used in practice. A "foreign-currency liquidity swap
line" is a parallel arrangement with foreign central banks that would enable the Federal
Reserve to quickly provide foreign currency liquidity to financial institutions in the United
States.
112. See generally Mehrling, supra note 20 (noting that central banks are both
banks of the state and banker's banks and that foreign exchange markets, therefore, consist
of interactions of both states and their banking systems).
113. See Goldberg et al., supra note 108.
114. The contracts include a commitment by the parties to purchase and
repurchase currency via a swap transaction; notice and duration provisions, which may be
waived or modified by the parties; creation of accounts for the counterparties at each central
bank; limitations on use of the accounts; setting of the exchange rate (the same for the spot
and forward legs) and interest payable; the transaction procedures; provisions for setoff and
rollover in the event of a party's default (no penalty rate is charged) warranties; and
provisions for termination and communications. See also Pistor, supra note 43, at 19 (noting
the exceptionally brief nature of the swap line contracts compared to the length of similar
contracts entered into by market participants, and explaining this discrepancy as reflecting
the identity of the counterparties and their position in the financial system).
115. See U.S. Dollar Euro Swap Agreement Dated as of May 10, 2010, FED.
RESERVE BANK OF N.Y. (May 10, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/FRBNYEC
BSwapAgreement.pdf [hereinafter U.S. Swap Agreement].
116. All of the material features of a secured loan are present: the principal (the
amount of dollars swapped), interest (the interest-based fee payment), and collateral (the
foreign currency held in the Federal Reserve's account at the foreign central bank). Of
course, the counterparty to this loan will generally have an excellent credit rating and the
unique ability to print money. The latter capability should ensure that the central bank never
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"policy rate(s)"1 7 rather than market rates. Swap lines are of course not necessary
to access foreign exchange at market rates. The Federal Reserve then deposits
dollars in the foreign central bank's account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. This credit becomes a balance sheet liability for the Federal Reserve. This
creates money." Similarly, the foreign central bank deposits its currency in the
Federal Reserve's account at the foreign central bank. This too creates money.
From its account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the foreign central
bank then distributes these dollars to borrowers through a selection process of its
choosing," 9 possibly at non-market rates.120 The Federal Reserve does not
participate in these distribution decisions121 or know the identity of the recipient
institutions.122
The second part of the "swap" transaction-the forward leg-consists of
the foreign central bank agreeing to repurchase its currency at a set future date for
a set price.123 The Federal Reserve has set this repurchase price at the same
exchange rate as in the first part of the transaction-the spot leg-to ensure that
the Federal Reserve receives back the exact nominal amount of dollars that it
defaults on its obligations. Additionally, the U.S. Treasury's Exchange Stabilization loans to
foreign countries are generally structured as currency swaps. See Russell Munk, A Modern
Legal History of Sovereign Debt: Exchange Stabilization Fund Loans to Sovereign
Borrowers: 1982-2010, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 215, 224 (2010).
117. See generally Mehrling, supra note 20 (noting that when two central banks
engage in currency transactions with each other, the interest rates involved in such
transactions will not necessarily be market rates; such rates could instead be policy rates
that reflect the noncommercial relationship of the central banks).
118. For example, the U.S. Dollar Euro Swap Agreement Dated as of May 10,
2010 states that: "On the Value Date [the date the first part of the swap transaction will take
place], the USD amount shall be credited to an account on the books of the FRBNY
designated in the name of the ECB (the "ECB Account"), and the EUR amount shall be
credited to the FRBNY Account." U.S. Swap Agreement, supra note 115, § 4(c).
119. Though not required, an auction process is typically used.
120. See generally Mehrling, supra note 20 (noting that the rate at which central
banks lend foreign currency to its "needy private citizen[s]" might not be a market rate.
Instead it reflects the noncommercial relationship between the central bank and financial
institutions in its jurisdiction).
121. The Federal Reserve explains that "[t]he foreign central bank receiving
dollars determines the terms on which it will lend dollars onward to institutions in its
jurisdiction, including how the foreign central bank will allocate dollar funds to financial
institutions, which institutions are eligible to borrow, and what types of collateral they may
borrow against." Credit and Liquidity Programs and the Balance Sheet: Frequently Asked
Questions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst
liquidityswaps.htm [hereinafter Credit and Liquidity Programs].
122. See Scott Lanman & Bradley Keoun, No One Says Who Took $586 Billion
in Fed Swaps Done in Anonymity, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2011, 4:01 PM), http://www.bloo
mberg.com/news/2011-12-1 1/no-one-says-who-took-586-billion-in-fed-swaps-done-in-
anonymity.html.
123. The time span ranges from overnight to 90 days, but can be enven longer.
See Credit and Liquidity Programs, supra note 121.
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originally swapped.12 4 The market value of this nominal amount will likely reflect
a gain or a loss to the Federal Reserve in real terms. The foreign central bank also
pays an additional fee based on a preset interest rate.12 5 Once the second part of the
transaction is completed, the money created by the central banks is removed from
the financial system. The swap lines are intended to be temporary measures, but
their use is becoming increasingly common. The Federal Reserve has now
extended the swap lines authorized in May of 2010 to last for at least four years.126
International policy makers are also increasingly advocating for a permanent
system of central bank swap lines.127
The foreign central bank repurchases its currency at the same exchange
rate with the dollars it borrowed. Therefore, the foreign central bank returns the
same nominal amount of dollars to the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve is not
exposed to fluctuations in foreign exchange rates in terms of receiving back the
same nominal amount of dollars sold; the nominal amount of dollars sold will be
the nominal amount resold. The swap line contracts also insulate the Federal
Reserve from interest rate fluctuations.128 The Federal Reserve is, however,
exposed to the credit risk of the foreign central bank. This risk is known as
"counterparty credit risk," the risk that one's counterparty could default on its
transaction obligations or become insolvent. Although the default risk of a major
central bank is generally viewed as minimal, it does exist.12 9 The swap line
contracts contain no penalty for default.13 0 If a sovereign were to default, seizing
the loan collateral would be difficult if not impossible because it is kept in an
account at the foreign central bank. Additionally, this collateral, which consists of
124. There is a risk that significant swap lines transactions could contribute to
depreciation of the dollar, which in turn would reduce the value of the predetermined
nominal amount to be returned by the foreign central bank.
125. See, e.g., U.S. Swap Agreement, supra note 115, § 3(b) (implementing an
interest rate that consists of the Overnight USC Indexed Swap Rate ("OIS") in addition to a
100 basis point spread).
126. See Peterson, supra note 8.
127. See Eva Kuehnen, ECB's Coeure Calls for Permanent Currency Swap Lines,
REUTERS (May 11, 2012, 5:29 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/05/1 /uk-ecb-coeure-
idUKBRE84AOVS2012051 1.
128. Kamin, supra note 7, at 47-48.
129. Some scholars argue that the Federal Reserve is actually "taking a very
substantial credit risk. There is really not much backing [of the loan]; even we cannot go
and sue the central banks. And even if we did, there is nothing much to grab even if we
could win a judgment[J" and that such practices, even if minimally risky, represent a
"dramatic change" in policy for the Federal Reserve. Bruce E. Aronson, The Financial
Crisis One Year Later: Proceedings of a Panel Discussion on Lessons of the Financial
Crisis and Implications for Regulatory Program, 43 CREIGHTON L. REv. 275, 311-12
(2010). For example, some central banks would not extend swap lines to Iceland's central
bank because of its counterparty credit risk. See Allen & Moessner, supra note 22, at 41.
For general background on central bank credit risk, see Willem Buiter, Can Central Banks
Go Broke? (CEPR Pol'y Insight No. 24, 2008), available at http://www.cepr.org
/pubs/policyinsights/CEPRPolicyInsight_024.asp.
130. See, e.g., U.S. Swap Agreement, supra note 115, § 5(b) (addressing the event
of default by either party to the transaction).
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foreign currency, could greatly decrease in value and be difficult to sell quickly.131
Only the foreign central bank is directly exposed to the credit risk of the
institutions receiving its dollar distributions.13 2 The foreign central bank is
obligated to return the loaned dollars to the Federal Reserve regardless of whether
the recipient institutions actually repay their loans.13 3
C. Background of the Swap Lines
In 1962, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York spearheaded an
international effort among major central banks to establish a swap line network.
The Bretton Woods international currency system 35 reigned over foreign
exchange markets. The heart of this system consisted of an exchange rate pegging
the U.S. dollar to gold. The swap line network established "standby
arrangements"' 3 6 that enabled the Federal Reserve to intervene in currency markets
to maintain the pegged exchange rate. In the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods
system collapsed. Although the swap lines remained in place,13 7 their use had
largely ceased until recently.138
The original primary purpose of the swap lines was to manage the dollar's
exchange rate. During the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve used swap lines to
act as the international dollar lender of last resort. The outsourcing of its bedrock
domestic lender of last resort role to 14 foreign central banks1 3 9 constituted a
131. See generally FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 36.
132. See Kamin, supra note 28, at 8.
133. The Federal Reserve is, of course, indirectly exposed to the credit risk of
these institutions via its direct exposure to the credit risk of the foreign central bank.
134. MARJORIE DEANE & ROBERT PRINGLE, THE CENTRAL BANKS 226 (1994).
135. The Bretton Woods International Currency System was a post-WWII
arrangement among international countries that were IMF members in which the U.S. dollar
was pegged at $35 to an ounce of gold. Other countries managed their exchange rates based
upon this peg. For additional background, see Michael D. Bordo, Owen F. Humage & Anna
J. Schwartz, U.S. Intervention During the Bretton Wood Era: 1962-1973 (Nat'l Bureau
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16946, 2011).
136. DEANE & PRINGLE, supra note 134, at 279.
137. See id. at 279.
138. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Federal Reserve
proactively used short-term swap lines to bolster liquidity in U.S. dollar funding markets.
See ALEXEENKO ET AL., supra note 61, at 22.
139. In 2007, the Federal Reserve established swap lines with the ECB and Swiss
National Bank. In 2008, it established swap lines with the following foreign central banks:
"Reserve Bank of Australia, the Banco Central do Brasil, the Bank of Canada, Danmarks
Nationalbank, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the
Bank of Korea, the Banco de Mexico, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank, the
Monetary Authority of Singapore, Sveriges Riksbank, and the Swiss National Bank." Credit
and Liquidity Programs, supra note 121. In May 2010, the Federal Reserve reestablished
swap lines with "the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the
Bank of Japan, and the Swiss National Bank." Id. And in November 2011, swap lines were
established with "the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the
European Central Bank, and the Swiss National Bank." Id.
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critical "metamorphosis"1 40 in the use of swap lines. There were "three broad
structural phases"141 in the use of the swap lines during the financial crisis. These
phases increasingly progressed in "the scope and potential size of the program."142
During the height of the crisis, four foreign central banks had access to unlimited
amounts of U.S. dollar liquidity via their swap lines with the Federal Reserve.14 3
The swap line amounts peaked in December of 2008 at approximately $583
billion-one-fourth of the Federal Reserve's assets.14 4
During the financial crisis, the swap lines served to "address money
market dysfunction and achieve broader financial stability."14 5 And "[u]nlike most
previous swap agreements, the post-2007 lines were not reciprocal. The [Federal
Reserve] System did not use (or invest) the foreign exchange that it acquired
through the swaps." 4 6 Therefore, the swap lines now "work asymmetrically in
practice 147 and are essentially secured loans.
In February 2010, the swap lines expired. After a mere two months, in
May 2010, the Federal Reserve reestablished swap lines with five foreign central
banks because of global financial market instabilities rooted in the European debt
crisis.148 Swap line amounts peaked at $109 billion in February 2012.149 In
December 2012, the Federal Reserve again extended the duration of its swap
lines. 150
D. The Current Swap Line Authority
A 1961 memorandum by Howard Hackley, then General Counsel of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, written to the FOMC,' 5 analyzes the
140. Bordo et al., supra note 22, at 2-3.
141. Fleming & Klagge, supra note 25, at 3.
142. Id.
143. These were the ECB, the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Japan, and Bank
of England. See Goldberg et al., supra note 108, at 8.
144. See Alexeenko et. al, supra note 61, at 24.
145. Goldberg et al., supra note 108, at 7.
146. Bordo et al., supra note 22, at 10.
147. FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 37; see also Allen & Moessner, supra note
22, at 10 (noting that "in practice, only one party normally uses the swap proceeds; the other
party simply holds them on deposit as collateral for the loan").
148. These were the central banks of the EU, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the
U.K.
149. Europe's Sovereign Debt Crisis: Causes, Consequences for the United States
and Lessons Learned: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight & Government Reform,
112th Cong. 16 (2012) (statement of Benjamin Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve).
150. See Peterson, supra note 8.
151. Bretton Woods Agreement Act Amendment: Hearing on H.R. 10162 Before
the Comm. on Banking & Currency, 87th Cong. (1962) [hereinafter Hackley Memorandum]
(including Memorandum of Howard Hackley, General Counsel, Bd. Of Govenors of the
Fed. Reserve); see also 2 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FED. RESERVE, BK. 1:
1951-1969 350 n.138 (2009) (noting that "Hackley's memo remains as the legal basis of the
Federal Reserve's holding of foreign exchange by purchase or 'warehousing' . . . ").
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legal authority for the Federal Reserve's swap lines. It argues that the legal
authority for the swap lines rests primarily in three parts of Section 14 of the
Federal Reserve Act ("FRA"): Section 14's first paragraph, section 14(a), and
section 14(e).152 The substance of all three parts dates back to 1913.153 The swap
lines are not an emergency authority.
The first paragraph of section 14 states:
Any Federal reserve bank may, under rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, purchase and sell in the open market, at home or abroad,
either from or to domestic or foreign banks, firms, corporations, or
individuals, cable transfers 154
Historically, cable transfers "were claims to foreign currency."'55 When Congress
passed the FRA, foreign exchange was bought and sold by "cable transfers." 5 6
Section 14(a) provides Federal Reserve banks the "power to deal in gold coin and
bullion at home or abroad, to make loans thereon."15 7 Finally, section 14(e) states
that "[e]very Federal reserve bank shall have power to establish accounts ... and,
with the consent or upon the order and direction of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and under regulations to be prescribed by said Board, to
open and maintain accounts in foreign countries, appoint correspondents, and
establish agencies in such countries wheresoever ....
Hackley argued for the legality of the swap lines based upon the FRA's
authorization for Federal Reserve banks to open accounts in foreign countries and
upon the ability of Federal Reserve banks to hold foreign currency in these
accounts as a result of "open market purchases of cable transfers, and bills of
exchange, through sales of gold to foreign banks, and through the establishment of
cross-credits or reciprocal balances between a Federal Reserve bank and a foreign
bank."15 9 Section 14 of the FRA is entitled "Open Market Operations." The swap
lines are deemed 60 "like" or "a type of open market operation."161 Section 12 of
152. Hackley Memorandum, supra note 151.
153. Id. at 156 (stating that "[a]ll of these provisions were contained in
substantially their present form in section 14 of the original Federal Reserve Act."
154. 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012).
155. MELTZER, supra note 151, at 349.
156. See David H. Small & James A. Clouse, The Scope of Monetary Policy Acts
Authorized Under the Federal Reserve Act 26 n.55 (FEDS, Working Paper No. 2001-40,
2004). The FOMC's Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations specifically directs
that the purchase/sale of foreign currencies must be "in the form of cable transfers."
FEDERAL OPEN MKT. COMM., Authorization for Foreign Currency Operations § 1(A) (Jan.
29, 2013), http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMCForeignAuthorizatio
n.pdf.
157. 12 U.S.C. § 354 (2012).
158. 12 U.S.C. § 358 (2012).
159. Hackley Memorandum, supra note 151, at 156.
160. As I argue in Part IV, infra, the swap lines more nearly resemble discount
window operations than open market operations.
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the FRA gives the FOMC authority over open market operations. The FOMC,
therefore, has traditionally had authority for swap line operations. The Federal
Reserve Board has traditionally had authority over the opening and the
maintenance of accounts with foreign banks based upon the language of section
14(e). Hackley noted that the swap lines involved a "complicated" jurisdictional
question between the Board and the FOMC and that "the exact boundaries" of the
respective jurisdictions "are difficult to determine."' 62
A more fundamental difficulty, as Hackley noted, was that "no provision
of present law . . . specifically refers to foreign currency or foreign exchange
operations by the Federal Reserve System; accordingly, it cannot be said that there
is explicit and clear authority for such operations."163 Hackley viewed a legal
challenge as unlikely, but he anticipated possible criticism of the swap lines "on
legal grounds."'" Not surprisingly, policy makers and academics have raised
questions about the Federal Reserve's swap line legal authority.165
Finally, Hackley's memorandum noted that the foreign accounts could
not "be invested in foreign Treasury bills or other obligations of foreign
governments or central banks" without additional legislation.166 Because of the
1980 amendments to the FRA,167 section 14 now states:
Every Federal Reserve Bank shall have power: (1) To buy and sell,
at home or abroad . . . obligations of, or fully guaranteed as to
principal and interest by, a foreign government or agency thereof,
such purchases to be made in accordance with rules and regulations
prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.168
Therefore, the Federal Reserve now has the legal authority to buy or sell foreign
government securities. Such transactions need not occur on the open market.169
III. PROBLEMS AND RISKS OF THE SWAP LINES
"Of course, you'd rather not use [swap lines],"17 0 Federal Reserve
Governor Jeremy Stein commented. Similarly, concerning the use of swap lines,
161. See MELTZER, supra note 151, at 353 for details about the historical
discussions as to whether the Federal Reserve Board or the FOMC should have authority for
the swap lines.
162. Hackley Memorandum, supra note 151, at 150-51.
163. Id. at 156.
164. Id. at 144.
165. See generally MELTZER, supra note 151, at 348 58; see also Audit the Fed:
Dodd-Frank, QE3, and Federal Reserve Transparency: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Domestic Monetary Policy and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 14
(2011) (testimony of Robert Auerbach, stating that "since 1962, [the Fed] makes loans to
foreign countries without congressional authorization").
166. Hackley Memorandum, supra note 151, at 144.
167. See Small & Clouse, supra note 156, at 33 n.72.
168. 12 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
169. See Small & Clouse, supra note 156, at 33.
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Chairman Bernanke stated: "We don't necessarily want to be providing a
permanent service for financial markets . . . . There's a good case that we should
put pressure, or at least try to influence, banks to better manage these currency
mismatches."' 7 '
Implicit in both statements is that the swap lines are potentially
problematic. Nevertheless, swap lines are set to become pivotal-and
competitive 72-connectors within the international monetary system and the
plumbing of global financial markets. Therefore, in this Part, I briefly describe
well-known potential problems with the Federal Reserve's swap lines, but then
also identify even more fundamental problems and risks that scholars and public
officials have overlooked. I argue that these potential problems and risks can be
broadly divided into two interrelated categories: "public policy" problems and
"supervisory and regulatory" problems.
A. Public Policy Problems
The Federal Reserve's swap lines have several potential public policy
problems. These include: expansion of the federal safety net and potential taxpayer
cost, distorting market pricing mechanisms, potential negative reputational effects
for the central bank, and the potential for interest group capture. I will explore each
in turn.
The Federal Reserve's swap lines, as currently used, are an expansion of
the federal safety net. As explained in Part I, both the Federal Reserve's traditional
lender of last resort power and its new market-maker of last resort function are
critical components of the federal safety net. The taxpayer ultimately backstops
this federal insurance system. When it outsources its dollar lender of last resort
function, the Federal Reserve is essentially acting as the dollar-market-maker of
last resort in foreign exchange markets.17 3 The percentage of the U.S. financial
sector already covered by the federal safety net is significant. The Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond estimates this number to have been approximately 57.1% at the
170. Governor Stein also commented that "[n]othing in life is a sure thing [but]
these are pretty riskless." Chris Cermak, Fed's Stein: Dollar Swap Lines with Cbanks
"Pretty Riskless," MKT. NEWS INT'L. (Dec. 17, 2012, 1:19 PM), https://mninews.marketne
ws.com/content/feds-stein-dollar-swap-lines-cbanks-pretty-riskless.
171. Luca Di Leo, Bernanke Continues Fight Against More Fed Scrutiny, WALL
ST. J., May 26, 2010, at A6 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
172. See Mishkin supra note 86. The use of central bank swap lines is expanding.
Central banks can form swap line networks in addition to bilateral arrangements. Associated
central banks could lend their currency to their trading partners at preferred rates. Such
preferences could potentially provide an economic advantage to institutions able to access
currencies at preferred, nonmarket rates. If such practices became widespread, this activity
could then impact the integrity of the market pricing mechanism in foreign currency
markets.
173. See generally Mehrling, supra note 20 (explaining that central banks can step
in to help prevent a collapse of the payment system or significant pricing distortions when
private dealers stop market-making activities).
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end of 2011.174 While the federal safety net provides stability to financial markets,
this stability also has important costs due to both the moral hazard and the
incentives it creates for financial institutions to assume excessive risk taking in
their investments. By internationally outsourcing its lender of last resort role
through the use of its swap lines, the Federal Reserve is also increasing these costs.
The federal safety net could also be extended in practice-though perhaps
unintentionally-to sovereign entities via the Federal Reserve's swap lines. As
noted in Part II, the Federal Reserve has the statutory authority to purchase
sovereign debt.17 5 This authority is intended to enable the Federal Reserve to invest
excess foreign currency holdings, not to bail out insolvent sovereigns. 17 6 Although
such a bailout is highly unlikely, the outsourcing of the Federal Reserve's lender of
last resort role can arguably accomplish a similar purpose. The provision of swap
line dollars by foreign central banks to foreign banks and financial institutions
holding distressed sovereign debt assets could help to prevent sales of these assets,
which could decrease their price. A fire sale of assets would make it more
expensive for the sovereign to borrow.
Relying on market mechanisms to meet dollar funding needs disciplines
banks, financial institutions, and sovereigns. 7 7 The swap lines decrease this
discipline because they can provide dollars at policy rates. They can also decrease,
ex ante, market participants' incentives to manage and price correctly liquidity risk
and to manage better their foreign currency funding mismatches. Financial market
instability occurs when uncertainty meets institutional liquidity constraints. 178
Although uncertainty is unknowable, potential liquidity constraints are largely the
result of financial institutions' balance sheet decisions, which are driven by profit
considerations.
Safety nets for banks and financial institutions are expensive, and
"financial safety nets for nations . . . are terribly expensive."17 9 Although the
Federal Reserve has made a profit on its swap lines, this consideration alone does
not reflect their true potential cost to the public. The dangers present here operate
in a loop. Financial stability is a positive good, but financial stability measures
create moral hazard, which can then lead to excessive risk taking. Excessive risk
taking can then lead to additional financial crises. Financial crises have devastating
174. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Our Perspective: Too Big to Fail,
RICHMONDFED.ORG, http://www.richmondfed.org/research/our-perspective/toobigtofaillinde
x.cfm#tabview=tab0 (last updated Feb. 20, 2013) (arguing that the combined, expansive
extent of both the explicit and implicit federal safety net for the financial sector decreases
market discipline).
175. 12 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
176. Small & Clouse, supra note 156, at 33 n.72.
177. See generally Mehrling, supra note 20.
178. See generally Pistor, supra note 43, at 6.
179. Systemic Risk, supra note 96, at 266 ("[A] nation that anticipates being
bailed out is likely to engage in morally hazardous behavior. Nations are much more likely
than financial institutions to engage in this behavior because nations, unlike firms, cannot be
liquidated, and also because governments have strong political incentives . . . to avoid
reducing services or raising taxes.").
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impacts on the economy. Such impacts include widespread job loss, loss of trust,
taxpayer subsidies and losses, and extended periods of low-perhaps near zero-
interest rates. Extended periods of abnormally low interest rates shift the costs of
financial crises to savers, such as retirees. They could also sow seeds of instability
that trigger the next financial crises as market participants make riskier
investments seeking higher investment returns. The emergence of a new financial
crisis leads once more to government assistance-such as use of the swap lines-
to restore financial stability. At this point, the loop begins again. While swap lines
have value in creating market stability, additional study is needed to evaluate the
costs associated with using swap lines to maintain global stability through
successive financial crises.
In discussing financial crises in economically emerging markets,
Professor Charles Calomiris argued that "[t]he explanation for the new epidemic of
worldwide banking instability is the roller coaster of risk produced by the choices
of banks in developing economies-choices that are the byproduct of government
subsidies for risk-taking"8 o According to Professor Calomiris, this assistance ends
up being "a threat to the stability of the world financial system."'"' As noted in
Part I, bank "runs" caused by the widespread withdrawal of short-term,
international creditors that have frequently precipitated financial crises in
economically emerging markets are now occurring in industrialized countries.
Therefore, the swap lines-government insurance mechanisms-risk a transfer of
this "roller coaster" of risk taking and its attendant instabilities to industrialized
countries.
As discussed in Part I, the credit risk of most foreign central bank
counterparties is negligible. But it is not zero. An extreme, but nevertheless
possible, example could be the collapse or breakup of a currency.' 82 If a sovereign
defaulted on its debt, the value of its currency-the Federal Reserve's swap line
collateral-would likely collapse. This collateral arrangement also has additional
problems. In the swap line contracts, the Federal Reserve's collateral is held in an
account at another foreign central bank. Therefore, it could ultimately be
inaccessible. Accounts at a foreign central bank are located in a jurisdiction
beyond the Federal Reserve's reach. In the event of default, the foreign central
bank could freeze this account, or other domestic insolvency proceedings might
also prevent seizure. Even if the collateral could be seized, it would likely be
difficult to sell without also causing further declines in the currency's value.
Importantly, the presence of an international dollar lender of last resort
distorts market functioning, particularly the market pricing mechanism for
liquidity, credit, and foreign exchange risk. The foreign exchange market is the
largest financial market in the world. As noted in Part II, central banks potentially
180. Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF's Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort,
17 CATO J. 275, 281 (1998).
181. Id. at 276.
182. Tom Braithwaite, Dan McCrum & Patrick Jenkins, Wall St Banks Prepare
for Euro Breakup (Fny. TIMEs Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e53c2c6a-
df2O-1 lel-97ea-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZWmWS4xw.
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transact not only with each other at policy rates, but also with the institutions in
their jurisdictions at policy rates.' 8 3 Therefore, the possibility of sustained,
significant swap line use and dependency ultimately risks the unmaking of
markets. In the absence of the Federal Reserve's swap lines, foreign central banks
would have to provide dollars to home institutions either from the foreign central
bank's own currency reserves (if sufficient reserves are even available)' 8 4 or by
first buying dollars in currency markets before reselling them to institutions.'8 5 If a
foreign central bank entered the market to buy dollars, this significant, increased
demand would also increase the exchange value of the dollar. This would also
decrease the exchange value of the foreign central bank's own currency. Indeed,
some argue that the swap lines have been used to support the value of foreign
currencies. 186
Swap lines also carry potential negative reputational risk for the Federal
Reserve for several reasons. The Federal Reserve's swap lines could be seen as
performing a foreign policy role, a task outside of the central bank's proper
sphere.187 Use of the swap lines also raises concerns about the central bank
performing a fiscal role, another task arguably outside of its proper sphere.' 8 And
questions concerning the statutory authority for the Federal Reserve's swap lines
continue.' 89 Finally, the relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury
"about the division of responsibility for foreign currency operations" 190 is highly
discretionary and risks questions about the central bank's independence.
Finally, swap lines are set to become critical, competitive components of
global financial market infrastructure. Such developments also increase the risk of
swap lines becoming a significant public choice problem.191 Without question, a
183. See U.S. Swap Agreement, supra note 115.
184. Fleming & Klagge, supra note 25, at 2.
185. Two additional, but less likely, possibilities are that the foreign central bank
could try to arrange to buy dollars from another foreign central bank with excess dollar
reserves, or it could try to arrange a dollar purchase or loan from a multilateral institution.
186. See RICKARDS, supra note 34, at 118 ("The consequences of a European
sovereign debt default for U.S. exporters to Europe would be too great; here was an entire
continent that was too big to fail. The U.S. bailouts, swap lines and support for issuers like
Fannie Mae were all part of a multifaceted, multiyear effort to prop up the value of the
euro.").
187. See, e.g., 140 Cong. Rec. H3348-49 (Daily Ed. May 16, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Henry B. Gonzalez, Chairman, H. Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs,
stating that "[t]he Federal Reserve's periodic forays into foreign policy by way of its swap
fund is certainly an issue that should be of immense concern to the Congress").
188. See the dissent of Jeffrey Lacker, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, to swap line arrangements because of their "amounting to fiscal policy."
Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee December 13, 2008, BD. OF GOVENORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE Sys, http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes201112
13.htm
189. See generally supra note 165.
190. See Fed. Open Mkt. Comm. Minutes 4-6 (Jan. 24 25, 2012).
191. See generally J. Lawrence Broz, The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of
Last Resort, 2007-2010 21 (Nov. 14, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
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large segment of the public is unhappy about the tremendous government
assistance to financial institutions during the recent crisis. Although an abundance
of information about the Federal Reserve's swap lines is available on the Internet,
much of the population arguably remains uninformed about these complex global
stability mechanisms and their potential problems, risks, and costs. Furthermore,
the potential cost of the swap lines is widely dispersed among the public.
Therefore, little incentive exists for individuals to become well informed about this
issue.
On the other hand, a small, resource-rich, concentrated interest group-
international banks and financial institutions-are very interested in the swap lines
because of the potential benefit and support they can provide to the group's risk-
taking activities. This circumstance is clear from reported discussions surrounding
the swap line between the Bank of England and the People's Bank of China.' 92 A
small group of international banks dominate trading in the foreign currency
markets.193 And the level of trading activity in these markets has "grown very
rapidly and is very large compared to activity in other financial markets." 94
Because the swap lines are government insurance, their use risks a potential wealth
transfer to international banks and financial institutions. Not only is it unclear
whether this is a potentially productive redistribution of social wealth, but also
whether this redistribution will increase the possibility of future market instability,
financial crises, and the subsequent need for additional swap line use.
B. Regulatory and Supervisory Problems
In addition to public policy problems, the swap lines create potential
supervisory and regulatory problems. These problems include the Federal
Reserve's inability to perform critical supervision and regulation required by the
traditional lender of last resort role, hold-up issues related to the dollar's
international position, and the problem of future uncertainty in global financial
markets.
A lender of last resort should be able to supervise and regulate the
financial institutions that potentially benefit from its assistance. Indeed, "the main
mechanism to reduce the moral hazard created by the financial safety net is the
regulation and supervision of institutions that benefit from it."' 95 In the absence of
this ability, the central bank must work in close connection with the supervisory
authority.196 For example, when the U.S. Treasury proposed an expansion of
(discussing empirical findings which - the author argues - suggest that the Federal
Reserve's swap lines during the financial crisis supported the interests of large U.S. banks).
192. See Lingling Wei & Jessica Mead, supra note 37.
193. See Galati, supra note 38, at 58.
194. Id.
195. SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 66. See also Calomiris, supra note
180, at 290 ("lender[s] of last resort (whether private or public) must be in the position to
observe and control the uses of the funds it provides.").
196. See SCHOONER & TAYLOR, supra note 19, at 271, 275 (noting disagreement
among academics as to whether the "central bank should have the formal responsibility for
banking supervision, over and above the functions required to perform its lender of last
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discount window lending for market stability purposes, it noted that such liquidity
issuance "would have to be supported by Federal Reserve authority to collect
information from and conduct examinations of borrowing firms in order to protect
the Federal Reserve (and thereby the taxpayer)." 97 The Federal Reserve's swap
lines resemble discount window lending. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve does
not have any supervisory or regulatory authority connected to its swap line use
with regard to either its foreign central bank counterparty or to the ultimate
beneficiaries of this liquidity assistance. As noted, the Federal Reserve does not
even know the identity of the ultimate beneficiary institutions. This is problematic.
A potential counterargument to this concern is that the ultimate
beneficiary institutions are likely to be overseen by the counterparty foreign
central banks. But this is not necessarily the case. For example, the European
Central Bank ("ECB"), currently the Federal Reserve's most significant swap line
counterparty, has limited supervisory authority over the European institutions that
most likely benefit from the ECB's swap line activities.198 The foreign central
banks make no commitment in their swap line contracts with the Federal Reserve
that recipient institutions will be limited to those they supervise and regulate.199
Most importantly, however, the supervision and regulatory authority of
the Federal Reserve in its role as lender of last resort is not fungible with that of
foreign central banks. A foreign central bank is the agent of a foreign sovereign to
whom the Federal Reserve has outsourced its lender of last resort power. With the
swap line transactions, the foreign central bank is also acting as a quasi-agent of or
intermediary for the Federal Reserve. Principal and agent relationships are
frequently characterized by incentive misalignments. Such potential misalignments
could create inefficiencies and additional moral hazard problems. For example, in
the case of the Federal Reserve and the ECB, both central banks desire global and
domestic financial market stability. But their incentives are misaligned in at least
three important ways. First, the ECB-or any foreign central bank-could have
decreased incentives to pressure its own institutions to pursue more prudent, less-
profitable balance sheet structures or other paths to reduce excessive risk-taking
activities. Second, as noted above, the swap lines could reduce a foreign
sovereign's incentives to undertake necessary fiscal reforms if foreign emergency
liquidity assistance is available to its domestic banks and financial institutions.
Third, the swap line relationship creates potential conflicts of interest and political
opportunism.
resort role," and noting that "if the bank regulator is not the central bank, the relationship
between the two institutions must be a close one").
197. U.S. TREASURY DEPT., BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL
REGULATORY STRUCTURE [hereinafter BLUEPRINT], 17 (2008).
198. See Jim Brunsden & Rebecca Christie, EU Seeks to Prevent ECB Dominance
of European Bank Authority, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2012, 8:54 AM), http://www.bloomber
g.com/news/2012-08-16/eu-seeks-to-prevent-euro-dominance-of-european-banking-
authority.html.
199. See, e.g., U.S. Swap Agreement, supra note 115.
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The dollar's international position creates contracting problems. The
Federal Reserve is the only institution that can "print" dollars. A ready substitute
to the dollar is not available and might not be in the near future. Consequently, the
uniqueness of the dollar creates symmetric "hold-up"-like problems between the
Federal Reserve and its foreign central bank counterparties. On the one hand, the
Federal Reserve could withhold emergency dollar liquidity from foreign central
banks, and this could risk a collapse of their banking system in a financial crisis.
On the other hand, the foreign central bank knows that the Federal Reserve is
unlikely to take such measures in a crisis precisely because there would likely be
possible negative impacts on the U.S. financial system. Therefore, the incentive of
the foreign central bank to hold sufficient reserve assets or to pressure its financial
institutions to reduce excessive risk-taking activities is decreased by this
knowledge.
Finally, future uncertainty is an extremely important problem, not only
for financial markets, but also for the Federal Reserve's swap lines. As in many
areas of financial regulation, uncertainty about future states of the world and the
interdependencies of international financial institutions could make it highly
difficult for central banks that create reserve currencies to commit to future
nonintervention if swap line contracts are violated or important financial
supervision, regulation, or reforms are neglected. If reserve currency central banks
cannot credibly commit to future nonintervention in the event of such shortfalls,
the availability of the swap lines risks becoming an anticipated certainty or the
new normal.
In order to address the public policy problems and regulatory and
supervisory problems discussed in this Part, I propose a much-needed, new swap
line framework in the next Part.
IV. RETHINKING THE SWAP LINE FRAMEWORK
Central bank swap lines are set to become pivotal-and competitive-
connectors within the international monetary system and the plumbing of global
financial markets. The Federal Reserve's swap lines will likely continue to play a
critical role in such developments for several reasons. First, systemic financial
crises are a feature of financial marketS200 and have only increased in frequency. 201
As the international currency, the dollar's global availability will likely continue to
be critical in stabilizing financial crises. Second, financial market developments
and innovations will continue to increase the possibility of systemic financial
200. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 1-25 (2011); see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon &
Christopher Muller, Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for
a Systemic Emergency Insurance Fund 9 28 (Columbia Law and Econ., Working Paper No.
374, 2010).
201. See RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OwN DESIGN: MARKETS,
HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 5 (2007).
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emergencies that require massive amounts of dollar liquidity for resolution.2 02
Finally, central bank swap line networks are becoming increasingly prevalent.2 03
Central bank swap lines are likely only beginning their global ascent. And
as the preceding Part argues, the Federal Reserve's swap lines have potentially
significant problems and risks. The Federal Reserve's swap lines are essentially
public insurance mechanisms. Therefore, their legal framework should not only
minimize the potential problems and risks associated with their use, but should
also be designed to ensure that overall use of the swap lines promotes important
public policy objectives. These objectives include: maintaining domestic financial
stability, increasing institutional accountability, minimizing moral hazard and
increased systemic risk, and limiting the growth of the Federal Reserve's role in
global financial markets. Rethinking and implementing a more robust swap line
legal framework can also assist in minimizing potential public choice concerns.
Importantly, a new framework would provide an important counterbalance to the
risk of potential financial industry pressures. For all of these reasons, the time is
right to rethink the legal framework for the Federal Reserve's use of swap lines.
A. A New Swap Line Framework
My proposed swap line framework is designed to be distinct from the
Federal Reserve's lending operations with private market actors and predicated
upon two prongs. The first prong of this framework provides for a new market
stability role for the U.S. Federal Reserve and for significant flexibility in its
emergency lending operations. The second prong of this framework provides
boundaries for this new flexibility, including limiting future extensions of the swap
lines and bolstering democratic accountability in their use.
1. A Distinct Framework
The statutory framework upon which the current swap line authority
relies largely addresses open market operations with private market actors. The
swap lines, however, more closely resemble discount window lending to select
foreign public actors. Therefore, a distinct statutory setting is necessary for the
Federal Reserve's swap line authority for at least two reasons.
202. For example, as I discuss in Part V, international regulatory reforms
increasingly mandate the use of central clearing parties ("CCP"), a financial market utility
endemic to financial markets, for certain types of derivatives in the $600 trillion-plus, over-
the-counter derivatives markets. Regulators have discussed the potential of setting up swap
lines between CCPs and central banks in a financial crisis. See Michael Watt, How the CCP
Location Debate Helped Split the EU, RISK.NET (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.risk.net/risk-
magazine/feature/2134744/ccp-location-debate-helped-split-eu.
203. For example, several economically emerging market countries recently
agreed "to build a financial safety net," including pooling of financial reserves and the use
of central bank swap lines. See Chris Giles, Bptcs to Create Financial Safety Net, FIN.
TIMES (June 19, 2012), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/Obfd6adfe-b9bb-1 lel-a470-00144
feabdcO.html#axzz2cwTG6sZh.
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First, a distinct setting recognizes the unique nature of lending
arrangements between the Federal Reserve and foreign central banks. The swap
line contracts between these parties are distinct from traditional contracts and
formal treaties. They are arguably more akin to informal regulatory arrangements
within an international central banking network. For example, as Katharina Pistor
notes, swap contracts between private actors are generally hundreds of pages
204long. But the Federal Reserve's swap line contracts, which underlie potentially
hundreds of billions of dollars in loans, are only seven pages.2 05 As discussed, the
collateral arrangements securing these loans to foreign central banks are also
unique and potentially problematic.
When the Federal Reserve extends loans to private market actors through
its traditional discount window lending operations, the collateral for these loans is
located in jurisdictionally accessible accounts. Similarly, the Federal Reserve has
significant supervisory and regulatory powers to address any breaches of these
lending arrangements. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve has no supervisory
or regulatory powers over a foreign central bank in the event of a contract breach.
This consideration could explain the absence of an explicit penalty in the event of
a default in swap line contracts.206 It seems highly unlikely that the Federal
Reserve would pursue judicial remedies against a foreign central bank.
Second, a distinct setting establishes a legal framework necessary to
support increasing cooperation between the Federal Reserve and foreign central
banks. A long history of informal central bank cooperation exists.2 07 For example,
the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS") was established in 1930. It is the
oldest international financial organization, and its members consist of central
banks or monetary authorities around the world.208 Its mission is "to serve central
banks in their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international
cooperation in those areas and to act as a bank for central banks."209
But central bank cooperation can take a variety of forms, from basic
,,210information sharing to "commonly agreed actions, such as a coordinated
211
reduction in interest rates. A swap line or currency agreement between the
Federal Reserve and a foreign central bank in which the Federal Reserve's
counterparty is a foreign central bank, rather than a private actor, arguably is a
204. See Pistor, supra note 43, at 18.
205. See, e.g., U.S. Swap Agreement, supra note 115.
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Richard N Cooper, Almost a Century of Central Bank Cooperation
(Bank for Int'l Settlements, Working Paper No. 198, 2006).
208. For a list of the members of the BIS, see Organization and Governance,
BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/about/orggov.htm (last modified Dec.
19, 2011).
209. See About BIS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/about/
index.htm?1=2 (last visited July 22, 2013).
210. See Cooper, supra note 207, at 2.
211. See Carter Dougherty & Edmund L. Andrews, Central Banks Coordinate
Global Cut in Interest Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/
09/business/09fed.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2.
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development that extends beyond informal cooperation among central banks.
Therefore, formal legal frameworks designed for the unique context of central
bank contracting relationships are necessary.
2. The First Prong of the Framework
Congress should give the Federal Reserve explicit emergency authority to
execute swap lines and designate the Federal Reserve as the market stability
regulator. Accordingly, the swap line legal framework should explicitly authorize
central bank liquidity swaps. Multiple reasons exist in support of this
recommendation. First, the current statutory language using "cable transfers" is
antiquated. Second, the use of "cable transfers" is in a statutory paragraph
primarily centered on the purchasing and the selling of private sector debt on the
open market.2 12 Finally, the suggested language would be clear and explicit. This
should remove any central bank reputational concerns surrounding use of the swap
lines.
This first prong provides significant "elasticity" 213 for the Federal Reserve
to act as an international dollar lender of last resort. Yet limiting the designation of
the Federal Reserve's authority to use swap lines to emergencies should also
ensure the minimization of their future use. This limitation would further minimize
the potential coverage of the federal safety net and potential cost to taxpayers,
market-pricing distortions, counterproductive impacts on other regulatory reforms,
and the potential for interest group capture. Designation of the Federal Reserve as
the market stability regulator supports the important public policy objective of
maintaining financial market stability.
a. The Federal Reserve's Swap Lines as an Explicit, Emergency
Authority
The Federal Reserve's swap lines should be designated an explicit,
emergency authority. That is, the use of swap lines should be solely conditioned on
"unusual and exigent circumstances." The Federal Reserve currently has at least
three explicit emergency authorities: its 13(3) emergency authority,214 its Dodd-
Frank Title VIII emergency authority,215 and its authority in "extraordinary
circumstances" to waive "ratio limits" related to statutory reserve requirements.2 1 6
All provide for significant flexibility in their use. The existing emergency
circumstances during the financial crisis justified the "metamorphosis" in the
Federal Reserve's use of swap lines to outsource its role as lender of last resort.
The Federal Reserve has continued to use the swap lines to ameliorate European
212. See generally Small & Clouse, supra note 156, at 25-32.
213. Pistor, supra note 43, at 170 (suggesting that certain law can be "elastic" in
times of financial crises and arguing that "[t]he elasticity of law can be defined as the
probability that legal commitments will be upheld in the future irrespective of changes in
circumstances; the lower that probability the more elastic the law").
214. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
215. 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012).
216. 12 U.S.C. § 461 (2012).
2013] SWAP LINES 639
instabilities whose contagion risks U.S stability. Economists also refer to swap line
~,217dollar liquidity as an "emergency provision. A legal framework governing the
Federal Reserve's use of swap lines should restrict their use to "unusual and
exigent" circumstances. Therefore, this authority will only be used in those types
of circumstances that provide the common justification for its use.
The Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency power 21 is designed to provide
emergency liquidity to a broad range of nondepository, domestic financial
institutions. These institutions do not routinely benefit from access to Federal
Reserve facilities, services, or its last resort liquidity provision. The identities of
the institutions that will be helped by the 13(3) emergency power in a financial
crisis are not generally known in advance of a crisis. Unlike depository
institutions, these institutions are not subject to the Federal Reserve's ex ante
supervision and regulation (or perhaps that of another domestic financial
regulator). And even though potential liquidity recipients of the Federal Reserve's
new Dodd-Frank Title VIII last resort lending authority219 will generally 2 2 0 be
subject to limited ex ante supervision and regulation by the Federal Reserve, this
lending authority is nevertheless reserved for "unusual or exigent" circumstances.
The Federal Reserve's foreign central bank swap line counterparties act
as intermediaries. The ultimate beneficiaries of the dollar loans provided by the
swap lines are foreign institutions. The Federal Reserve does not know the identity
of these institutions, nor does it supervise or regulate them. Indeed, minutes from
the FOMC note "the importance of ensuring that these temporary swap lines . . . be
used only for the purposes intended."221 But ensuring the swap lines' intended use
is currently beyond the Federal Reserve's supervisory or regulatory capacities. If
domestic, nondepository financial institutions, whose identity is known to the
Federal Reserve, receives it's credit and liquidity assistance only in emergencies,
this limitation on assistance should also apply to unknown overseas institutions.
Otherwise, overseas financial institutions could receive an advantage over
domestic ones. This concern is not hypothetical. For example, minutes from an
217. See Allen & Moessner, supra note 22, at 1.
218. See 12 U.S.C. § 343.
219. See 12 U.S.C. § 5465.
220. Note that Title VIII provides for emergency designations of systemically
significant financial market utilities. If an emergency designation were made, it could be the
case that the designated institution would not previously have been under the Federal
Reserve's supervision. See id.
221. FOMC notes indicate that in considering whether swap lines should be
extended to the central banks of Mexico, Brazil, Korea, and Singapore, "[s]everal
participants pointed to the international reserves held by the countries and the importance of
ensuring that these temporary swap lines, like the others that had been established during
this period, be used only for the purposes intended." Minutes of the Federal Open Market
Committee Oct. 28-29, 2008, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs.,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes20081029.htm (last visited
Sept., 10, 2013, 6:18 PM).
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FOMC meeting on December 13, 2011 indicate a concern that a reduction in the
interest rates on the swap lines could potentially advantage non-U.S. banks.2 2 2
Designating the Federal Reserve's swap lines as an "emergency power"
would also have an important regulatory policy role and an important educational
role. Limiting the use of swap lines to emergency situations would signal to
international financial institutions that such liquidity assistance should not be
expected or considered routine. Financial institutions should not depend on the
223
swap lines in managing and pricing their balance sheet risks. Ideally, this
knowledge should encourage financial institutions to improve their risk
management practices. It would make the federal safety net or insurance provided
by the swap lines uncertain at best. It should also promote better pricing of
liquidity risk and foreign currency funding risk by financial markets.
The "emergency" designation would play an important public education
role. Public awareness and accountability is essential to maintaining the credibility
and independence of a central bank in a democracy. The Federal Reserve has
224posted a significant amount of information about the swap lines on its website.
But a notification that the Federal Reserve is using an "emergency authority" is
much more newsworthy and more likely to focus public attention on the existing
political and economic exigencies justifying their use.
In addition to designating the swap lines as an explicit emergency
authority, the Federal Reserve's emergency powers should be harmonized. The
first harmonization measure that should be implemented is that all of the Federal
Reserve's unusual lending authorities should be reserved for emergencies only,
that is, "unusual and exigent" circumstances. This sets a clear public policy
standard for the use of such lending authorities. Different standards suggest
gradients of emergency, which seems nonsensical. A second consolidation and
rationalization that should occur is that the possibility of exceptional Federal
Reserve credit and liquidity assistance should require appropriately designed,
parallel governance and accountability measures. For example, Dodd-Frank
mandated significant accountability, transparency, and collateral requirements in
222. The minutes state: "It was also noted that the proposed reduction in pricing
of the existing swap arrangements could put the cost of dollar borrowing from foreign
central banks below the Federal Reserve's primary credit rate and that non-U.S. banks
might be perceived to have an advantage in meeting their short-term funding needs as a
result." Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee Dec. 13, 2011, BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcminutes201
11213.htm (last visited Sept., 10, 2013, 6:20 PM).
223. For example, international banks whose activities are dependent upon
foreign currency funding could opt to ensure that their reserve liquidity resources include
such currency. See generally RICARDO CORREA, HoRAcIo SAPRIZA & ANDREI ZLATE,
LIQUIDITY SHOCKS, DOLLAR FUNDING COSTS, AND THE BANK LENDING CHANNEL DURING
THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN CRISIS 5 (2013).
224. See Credit and Liquidity Programs, supra note 121.
2013] SWAP LINES 641
the use of the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency power.22 5 Similar mandates
should be applicable to all of the Federal Reserve's emergency authorities.
b. The Federal Reserve as the Market Stability Regulator
The first prong of my framework also includes expanding the Federal
Reserve's mandate to explicitly include the role of market stability regulator. This
proposal harmonizes with designating the swap lines as an emergency authority.
The Federal Reserve's current emergency authorities implicitly act as financial
stability mechanisms. And these powers should remain emergency authorities even
once the Federal Reserve is designated as the market stability regulator.
The Federal Reserve's explicit statutory mandate is price stability and full
employment.2 2 6 While these longstanding objectives implicitly require attention to
financial stability,227 financial stability itself-domestic or international-is not an
independent mandate of the Federal Reserve. Central bankers are increasingly
focused on central banks having "the explicit goal of financial stability." 2 2 8 A legal
framework, however, should ultimately determine the parameter of the central
banks' stability role. In practice, Congress has all but provided the Federal Reserve
with the authority necessary to be the market stability regulator.2 2 9
In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department issued a report entitled Blueprint
for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure.2 3 0 One of its recommendations
was to designate the Federal Reserve as the "market stability regulator." 2 3 1
Accordingly, the Federal Reserve would be responsible "for overall issues of
,,232financial market stability. It would also receive increased powers of regulation
and supervision over institutions that could potentially receive assistance from its
233
stability measures. The Federal Reserve would also have authority "to undertake
market stability discount window lending."2 3 4 Some economists, however, argued
235that the Federal Reserve's history did not support this designation. Additionally,
as the Blueprint notes, market discipline is thought to be the most effective method
of limiting systemic risk. 236 Minimizing systemic risk promotes financial market
225. See Dodd Frank § 1101.
226. 12 U.S.C. § 225a.
227. See Duke, supra note 22, at 1.
228. Rethinking, supra note 15, at iii.
229. See generally Baker, supra note 79, at 71.
230. BLUEPRINT, supra note 197.
231. Id. at 137.
232. Id. at 15.
233. See id.
234. Id. at 17. Note that the Federal Reserve's new credit and liquidity authority
in Dodd Frank's Title VIII makes expansive provision for such lending. See Baker, supra
note 79, at 126-27.
235. MELTZER, supra note 75, at 1250. See generally RICKARDS, supra note 34,
170-76.
236. BLUEPRINT, supra note 197, at 15 n.2 ("[T]he [President's Working Group]
PWG, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the [Office of Comptroller of Currency]
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stability. Dodd-Frank did not implement the Blueprint's recommendation or
designate the Federal Reserve as the "market stability regulator." Nevertheless,
implementation of the Blueprint's recommendation is largely the practical effect of
at least two of Dodd-Frank's reforms. The first is Dodd-Frank's creation of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"), a new supervisory council of
237financial regulators. In practice, the FSOC lacks the supervisory and
enforcement authority necessary to itself respond to the emerging threats to
financial stability it is tasked with overseeing. 238 Consequently, the Federal
Reserve will likely undertake, in practice, any necessary stability action because it
is the only institution with the requisite legal authority. The second reform is the
Federal Reserve's new, last-resort lending authority in Title VIII. 239 It is designed
to stabilize disruptions in the payment, clearing, and settlement systems-or
financial market plumbing-that lie at the heart of smoothly functioning, stable
financial markets. Significant disruptions to these systems could have a
devastating impact on financial market stability, as illustrated in the recent
financial crisis.240
In sum, Congress should explicitly designate the Federal Reserve as the
market stability regulator for at least three reasons. First, the composition of the
FSOC includes ten voting members,241 but its powers fall short of including the
measures necessary to stabilize financial markets. Therefore, no individual
domestic financial regulator will necessarily have ownership of, or responsibility
for, the FSOC's decisions about financial market stability. This risks potential
ineffectiveness and dilution of regulatory accountability. The Federal Reserve has
several advisory councils. The FSOC could become an additional advisory
committee of the Federal Reserve that is tasked with advising the central bank
about market stability.
Second, financial stability and monetary policy have become increasingly
intertwined. The Blueprint recognizes this reality: "As is the case today, important
elements of the Federal Reserve's market stability role would be conducted
through the implementation of monetary policy and the provision of liquidity to
the financial system."242 In other words, the Federal Reserve already implicitly
performs important aspects of a market stability regulator role. Financial stability
OCC have previously stated that market discipline is the most effective tool to limit
systemic risk."). See also MELTZER, supra note 75, at 1250.
237. See 12 U.S.C. § 5321 (2012).
238. This is clear from reviewing the FSOC's duties in § 112(a)(2), none of which
include actual supervision, regulation, or enforcement. 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2) (2012).
239. See generally Baker, supra note 79, at 109-112.
240. See generally PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT 96, 124 (2011) ("[T]he crisis was, at least in part,
about unprecedented stress on the payments infrastructure" and "what immediately draws
attention is the utter breakdown of the underlying system of funding liquidity. This is the
plumbing behind the walls, and it failed very dramatically.").
241. See 12 U.S.C. § 5321(j)(1).
242. BLUEPRINT, supra note 197, at 15.
642 [VOL. 55:603
2013] SWAP LINES 643
measures, however, can become fiscal measureS243 because such measures often
amount to targeted credit allocations. Explicit recognition of the Federal Reserve's
market stability regulator role would encourage Congress to address the
increasingly complex relationship between monetary policy and financial market
stability measures of a fiscal character.
Third, the provision of financial stability creates moral hazard; these
considerations are always in tension. Explicit statutory recognition of the Federal
Reserve's market stability regulator role should also be accompanied by regulatory
reforms designed to minimize the moral hazard this role creates. It should also
incentivize reforms to reinforce market discipline for increased effectiveness of the
regulation of systemic risk.2 44 The solution to "fundamental sources of financial
strains,"2 45 such as international dollar liquidity shortages, should not be ex post
government insurance provided by swap lines. Ex ante reforms should play a more
critical role in minimizing the root causes-such as excessively risky balance sheet
structures-of the need for an international lender of last resort.
Finally, an explicit designation would have reputational benefits for the
Federal Reserve and would decrease risks to its independence.
3. The Second Prong of the Framework
The second prong of this framework provides boundaries for this new
flexibility, including limiting future extensions of the swap lines and bolstering
democratic accountability in their use. It is designed to limit the significant
flexibility that the first prong of the framework provides and to promote increased
democratic accountability. This promotes the public policy objectives of increased
institutional accountability, minimization of moral hazard and increased systemic
risk, and limiting the Federal Reserve's role in financial markets.
a. Increased Accountability Measures
To increase democratic accountability, the use of the Federal Reserve's
swap lines should be authorized by the Board of Governors (Board) rather than the
Federal Open Markets Committee ("FOMC"). The text of Section 14 of the
Federal Reserve Act ("FRA") suggests that the Board of Governors is the
appropriate body for approval because "cable transfers" are to be bought and sold
"under rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors."246 Above, I
argued that the swap lines should be designated as an explicit emergency
authority. 7 The Federal Reserve's emergency discount window lending
authorities all require approval by the Board of Governors, not the FOMC. Of
necessity, the Federal Reserve's emergency authorities are highly discretionary.
243. See BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 77, at 48.
244. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 197, at 15 n.2.
245. Di Leo, supra note 171.
246. The statutory text reads: "Any Federal reserve bank may, under rules and
regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, purchase
and sell in the open market .. . cable transfers . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012).
247. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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Therefore, it is critical that this discretion be accompanied by explicit, strong
political accountability in the use of such authority.
The actions of the Board carry significantly more political accountability
than those of the FOMC. With advice and consent of the Senate, the President
appoints the Board's members.248 This is not true in the case of the FOMC. The
presidents of the regional Federal Reserve Banks-5 of the FOMC's 12
members-are appointed by the Boards of Directors of each Reserve Bank and are
subject to the Board's approval. 2 4 9 Historically, the FOMC has been controversial
because of the selection process for each Reserve Bank president.2 5 0
Congress somewhat addressed this longstanding concern in Dodd-Frank.
Now the presidents of each Reserve Bank are chosen only by their Class B and
251Class C directors. Private banks that are members of the regional Federal
Reserve Banks elect the Class A and Class B directors (who are to represent the
public interest)252 of their regional Reserve Bank. The Board of Governors
appoints the Class C directors. In the swap lines' early days, these types of
considerations led some members of the Board to argue that the Board should be
253
responsible for swap line decisions. Nevertheless, the FOMC became
responsible for swap line authorization because of its related responsibility for
254
open market operations.
In September of 2008, the FOMC "voted unanimously to authorize its
Foreign Currency Subcommittee to direct the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
to expand existing swap arrangements as needed and to enter into new
arrangements with foreign central banks to address strains in money markets."2 5 5
One rationale behind this decision was the increased flexibility and speed this
delegation would provide the Federal Reserve in responding to possible requests
248. 12 U.S.C § 241 (2012).
249. See 12 U.S.C. § 341 (2012).
250. See generally MICHAEL MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION,
§ 1.11(b) (3d ed. 2011) (noting that "[t]he legitimacy of the FOMC has been subjected to
repeated, unsuccessful constitutional attacks, because of the selection of the five reserve
bank representatives without appointment by the president and advice and consent of the
Senate as provided in the Constitution's appointments clause").
251. 12 U.S.C. § 341.
252. 12 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
253. See MELTZER, supra note 151, at 348 (particularly the section on Exchange
Market Intervention).
254. Id. at 354.
255. Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, September 16, 2008, BD. OF
GOVENORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc
minutes20080916.htm. "The Foreign Currency Subcommittee consists of the Chairman and
Vice Chairman of the Committee, the Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors, and such
other member of the Board as the Chairman may designate (or in the absence of members of
the Board serving on the Subcommittee, other Board members designated by the Chairman
as alternates, and in the absence of the Vice Chairman of the Committee, the Vice
Chairman's alternate)." Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee January 24-25,
2012, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monet
arypolicy/fomcminutes20l20l25.htm.
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from foreign central banks for swap line assistance in a time of "severe stresses in
dollar funding markets."2 5 6 This same rationale also supports my argument that the
Board of Governors, rather than the FOMC, should approve the swap lines.
Similarly, the Board's smaller size enables more rapid and flexible decision
making in comparison to the FOMC. Swap line decisions should be delegated up,
that is, assigned to the Board, to increase the political accountability of these
decisions.
The strongest argument against requiring that the Board be tasked with
approving swap line transactions is that the FOMC is responsible for open market
operations. Traditionally, the swap lines have been viewed as a "type of or open
market operation."2 57 Indeed, as noted, Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act is
entitled "Open Market Operations." But the Board composes at least half of the
members of the FOMC, so a critical mass of the FOMC will not be uninvolved in
decisions about the swap lines. More importantly, "cable transfers" are arguably
more similar to open market operations when used to buy or sell foreign exchange
"in the open market" 258 than when used to buy or sell currency from or to the
issuer of the currency itself. Therefore, it is unclear how closely the swap lines
resemble typical open market operations. Instead, swap lines with select foreign
central banks, potentially at nonmarket policy rates, seem to more closely resemble
targeted discount window lending. And the Board is responsible for approving
discount window lending, which is authorized by its emergency legal
authorities.2
My framework also conceptualizes several additional accountability
measures in the use of the swap lines. The vast administrative law literature
examining the increasingly prevalent practice of outsourcing or "privatization" of
government functions to private actors provides helpful guidance. 2 60 The practice
,,261
of government outsourcing has been referred to as "government by contract. A
common focus in this literature is maintaining robust democratic accountability in
this outsourcing.2 62 Constitutional concerns can be particularly acute if the
256. Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, September 16, 2008, BD. OF
GOVENORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc
minutes20080916.htm.
257. See MELTZER, supra note 151, at 354.
258. See 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012).
259. MEHRLING, supra note 240, at 121 (noting that the swap lines "amounted to
an extension of discount window borrowing to foreign banks, but with foreign central banks
as intermediary taking all the credit risk").
260. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 543 (2000); Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New
Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 813 (2000); Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and
Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Contracting Out and the Evolving Law
of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859 (2000); Gillian Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003).
261. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Reframing the Outsourcing Debates, in
GOVERNMENT By CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEVIOCRACY 1 (Jody Freeman
& Martha Minow eds., 2009).
262. See, e.g., Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privitization and Democracy, in GOVERNMENT
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governmental outsourcing involves "control over third parties' access to
government resources and benefits."2 63 Similar concerns are also applicable when
the government outsources its resources to foreign public actors. Such is the case
when the Federal Reserve outsources its role as lender of last resort to foreign
central banks.
Finally, the Federal Reserve should insist, through its swap line contracts,
on increased transparency of the ultimate recipients of its emergency dollar
funding. The swap lines outsource the Federal Reserve's bedrock power as the
central bank-its lender of last resort function-to foreign central banks. Yet the
Federal Reserve does not know the identity of the ultimate recipients of its global
emergency liquidity assistance. This is problematic for many reasons, including a
lack of democratic accountability. By including provisions for increased
transparency in its swap line contracts, the Federal Reserve could seek to limit by
contract the types of eligible recipient institutions. Such measures would promote
democratic accountability. Another option would be to seek a contractual
commitment of the disclosure of the identities of the ultimate recipient institutions
after a time lapse similar to that in the case of its lending to domestic
*26institutions,264 although this suggestion could conflict with other related laws.
Another possible alternative would be for the foreign central bank to generate, ex
ante, a potential list of recipients of the dollar liquidity assistance even if actual
recipients are not disclosed. Any of these possibilities would be a helpful
improvement. Such measures would also generally harmonize with the Federal
Reserve's usual practice of open market operations (which the swap lines are
commonly thought to resemble). For example, only certain designated financial
institutions, known as "primary dealers," generally participate in open market
operations with the Federal Reserve.2 65
b. Limitations on the Swap Line Power
My proposed framework would limit the Federal Reserve's swap line
authority in several important ways. These limitations serve the purpose of
minimizing the moral hazard and the resultant increase in systemic risk, and
limiting the growth of the Federal Reserve's role in financial markets. Congress
could limit the Federal Reserve's authority to use swap lines in the following
ways: selecting the foreign central banks eligible for swap line arrangements,
placing caps on the amounts of these arrangements, mandating additional collateral
and security measures, and prohibiting extensions of the swap lines to
nongovernmental overseas third parties. Such limitations do not interfere with the
Federal Reserve's independence or necessary flexibility. In fact, most of these
By CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 261, at 276-85.
263. See MELTZER, supra note 75, at 1371.
264. For example, the Federal Reserve must disclose discount window lending to
domestic institutions after a period of 24 months. 12 U.S.C. § 248(s) (2012).
265. See Primary Dealers List, FED. RESERVE BANK N.Y. (June 12, 2003),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2003/anO30612.html.
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measures are comparable to ones already in place in the use of its other emergency
authorities.
First, Congress should select the foreign central banks eligible to be swap
line counterparties and consider placing quotas on these arrangements. Designating
eligible central banks is a limitation similar to those placed on potential recipients
of the Federal Reserve's domestic emergency authorities. The foreign central
banks selected by Congress would likely be the very same ones as those with
which the Federal Reserve has or has had swap line arrangements. Nevertheless, it
is important that Congress designate these potential counterparties for at least two
reasons. First, such designation shields the Federal Reserve from having to select
among potential counterparties and the related political questions that could arise
based upon its selection.266 Such questions could have a negative reputational
impact. Second, the swap lines can take on a fiscal role by allocating credit. It is
therefore arguably appropriate that Congress create such restrictions.
Second, Congress should mandate increased collateral security
requirements in swap line contracts, similar to those mandated in Dodd-Frank for
the Federal Reserve's 13(3) emergency authority.2 67 As discussed, the credit risk of
a foreign central bank is negligible, but it does exist. The current collateral
arrangements for swap lines, as discussed in Part II, should be strengthened. For
example, swap line collateral arrangements could consist of a mixture of foreign
currency and of high-quality, dollar-denominated assets.2 68 And at least some of
this collateral should be more readily accessible to the Federal Reserve to seize if
necessary. Accordingly, some amount of collateral should be placed either in an
account at the Federal Reserve or in a neutral international location. If swap lines
become a permanent feature of international financial markets-as is likely to be
the case-the international community should create truly international collateral
repositories.269
Third, a crucial aspect of my framework is its limitation on highly
foreseeable future expansions in the use of the swap lines. I argue that the lack of
limitations to the use of the Federal Reserve's swap lines, based upon the current
legal interpretation of the statutory framework, could lead to significant
expansions in their use. For example, swap line arrangements could be made with
266. For example, during a 2009 congressional hearing, Chairman Bernanke was
specifically questioned about outstanding swap line amounts to the central bank of New
Zealand. See CSPAN, supra note 10.
267. See 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
268. See Allen & Moesnser, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that swap line collateral
could consist of assets other than foreign currency).
269. A relevant recent development surrounding the use of collateral in
international financial markets is the announcement by the Depository Trust and Clearing
Corporation, based in the United States, and Euroclear, based in Belgium, of plans to create
a shared collateral pool. See Phillip Stafford, DTCC and Euroclear to Share Collateral
Pool, FIN. TIMES, May 13, 2013, at 20.
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third-party, nongovernmental overseas institutions.270 This possibility would
significantly expand the Federal Reserve's international lender of last resort role. It
would also directly expose the Federal Reserve to the credit risk of the
nongovernmental institution. This also would, in turn, greatly expand the potential
problems and risks discussed in Part III, which are already associated with the
swap lines' use. For example, although a major central bank's credit risk is likely
negligible, this is not necessarily true of a third-party, nongovernmental overseas
counterparty. Therefore, the Federal Reserve should at most only be directly
exposed to the credit risk of the foreign central bank. Thus, to minimize this risk,
my framework limits swap line counterparties to congressionally selected central
banks.
One example of a potential extension of the Federal Reserve's swap lines
could be to an overseas central clearing party ("CCP"). CCPs are back office trade
processing utilities prevalent in financial markets.271 They are also among the most
important sources of systemic risk in financial markets because they concentrate
vast amounts of credit risk. An overseas domiciled CCP could potentially need
272emergency dollar liquidity assistance. The reality of this possibility is clear from
273the European Union "location policy" controversy. European Union regulators
anticipate that foreign domiciled CCPs, which settle Euro-denominated contracts,
274
could need emergency euro liquidity assistance in a crisis situation. Therefore,
the European Union wants to be able to supervise and regulate these CCPs and is
insisting that such CCPs be physically located in the European Union. CCPs that
settle dollar-denominated contracts could also need emergency dollar liquidity
assistance.
Section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act ("FRA") states that "cable
transfers" can be purchased or sold "from or to domestic or foreign banks, firms,
corporations, or individuals."275 Therefore, the Federal Reserve's swap line
counterparties are not limited by the statute to foreign central banks. A CCP is a
corporation. Although it is unlikely that a swap line arrangement would be put into
place between the Federal Reserve and an overseas CCP, it is possible. In practice,
the Federal Reserve's counterparties are likely to remain foreign central banks. My
proposed swap line framework argues for this limitation. This restriction should
aid in limiting moral hazard. Otherwise, incentives could be created for CCPs to
270. Section 1103(b) of Dodd Frank suggests this possibility because it requires
that information about swap line transactions with a nongovernmental third party be
publicly disclosed after two years. See 12 U.S.C. § 248(s) (2012).
271. See generally PETER NORMAN, THE RISK CONTROLLERS: CENTRAL
COUNTERPARTY CLEARING IN GLOBALISED FINANCIAL MARKETS (1st ed. 2011).
272. News reports relay that regulators have proposed setting up swap lines
between central banks to assist CCPs in a crisis. Watt, supra note 202.
273. See generally id. Recent E.U. political developments could facilitate a
resolution to the location policy controversy. See A Good Day for Britain in Europe, FIN.
TIMES (June 18, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aa65c53a-d8 10-1 1e2-9495-
00144feab7de.html#axzz2cwTG6sZh.
274. See generally Watt, supra note 202.
275. 12 U.S.C. § 353 (2012).
2013] SWAP LINES 649
relocate their business to more relaxed overseas regulatory jurisdictions. A CCP or
other potential third party nongovernmental counterparty would most likely have
an account at the foreign central bank in its jurisdiction. To minimize counterparty
credit risk, the Federal Reserve should be at most only directly exposed to the
foreign central bank's credit risk.
A distressed overseas CCP confronting a dollar liquidity shortage could
present a much more significant risk to domestic U.S. financial stability than that
presented by individual overseas financial institutions facing short-term dollar
funding shortages. CCPs are some of the most critical components of international
financial market settlement systems. A distressed CCP could create significant
international "bottlenecks" in financial markets. The legal possibility of a swap
line between the Federal Reserve and an overseas CCP 276 would be significant for
at least four reasons. First, as noted, the potential problems and risks discussed in
Part III would be equally applicable, if not exacerbated, in this context. In
particular, the Federal Reserve would not have supervisory or regulatory authority
over such an entity. International bank regulators are discussing "co-operative
arrangement[s]" 27 7 for CCP oversight. But it remains unclear whether such
oversight is a sufficient substitute for traditional supervision and regulation.
Second, the amount of emergency dollar liquidity a financially distressed CCP
could potentially need would likely be many times that of current swap line
amounts. For example, when Lehman Brothers defaulted, its open positions with
LCH.Clearnet Group's CCPs were a notional $10 trillion.278 Third, the CCP
collateral available to secure emergency dollars-likely in the form of a
repurchase agreement-could consist of a very broad range of private market
securities of uncertain market value.
Finally, a swap line extension to overseas CCPs would, in important
respects, be the international equivalent of the Federal Reserve's new Dodd-Frank
Title VIII credit and liquidity authority, which is itself controversial. 279 The current
swap line statutory framework could support swap line arrangements with an
overseas CCP similar to the authority in Title VIII to support emergency central
bank assistance to certain domestic CCPs. 280 Issues related to the domestic
controversy would be applicable to, if not more important in, the case of swap
lines with an overseas CCP.
The swap lines and the Title VIII authority are likely to be interrelated in
practice. The Financial Stability Oversight Council designated eight financial
276. Section 1103 of Dodd Frank requires that open market transactions "with a
nongovernmental third party" pursuant to its swap line authority in 12 U.S.C. § 353 be
disclosed after a two-year period. 12 U.S.C. § 248(s) (2012).
277. See Watt, supra note 202.
278. NORmAN, supra note 271, at 26. Note that dollar-denominated contracts
likely only constitute part of this total amount. This example is merely used to show how
large such portfolios could be in practice.
279. See generally Baker, supra note 79.
280. See 12 U.S.C. § 5465 (2012).
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market utilities as "systemically significant." 281 One important implication of this
designation is that Federal Reserve lending in "unusual or exigent" circumstances
can assist these institutions.2 82 CLS Bank International ("CLS") is one of the
institutions that received this designation.2 83 CLS describes itself as playing "a
fundamental role in the FX [foreign exchange] market-it operates the largest
multicurrency cash settlement system . . . . Owned by 73 of the world's leading
financial institutions, CLS settles payment instructions related to underlying FX
transactions in 17 currencies."2 84
International financial regulatory reforms-such as those of the G20-are
increasingly mandating the use of CCPs for clearing "standardized" derivatives in
the $639 trillion notional-amount, 2 85 over-the-counter derivatives market.
Consequently, CCPs should only increase in size and global systemic importance.
Such developments are likely also to increase the possibility that a distressed,
overseas CCP might need last resort emergency dollar assistance. In advance of
such emergencies, the swap line framework should be clearly restricted to central
bank counterparties so that relevant overseas CCPs arrange potential emergency
liquidity provision prior to a crisis.
C. Objections to a New Swap Line Framework
Opponents of a new legal framework for the Federal Reserve's swap lines
may object to my proposal for at least four reasons: first, a desire to forbear in
favor of a truly global solution; second, a concern about preserving central bank
independence; third, a belief that the swap lines should be completely abolished;
and fourth, a belief that the status quo is not problematic and should continue.
First, opponents could argue that global financial market liquidity
problems require a truly international solution. To date, the Federal Reserve's
swap line counterparties have been foreign central banks-that is, sovereign
actors. Opponents could argue that the status quo should remain until the advent of
a truly international solution. It is unclear, however, when a truly global solution to
continuing, significant international liquidity issues will be found. And when
economists do posit potential international solutions to global liquidity shortages,
the institutions at the center of such proposed infrastructures frequently have
281. See Financial Stability Oversight Council Makes First Designations in Effort
to Protect Against Future Financial Crises, U.S. DEP'T TREASURY (July 18, 2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl645.aspx [hereinafter
Financial Stability Oversight Council].
282. See 12 U.S.C. § 5465.
283. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, supra note 281. For additional
information about CLS Bank's role in financial markets, see Galati, supra note 38.
284. CLS Designated a Systemically Important FMU, CLS-GROUP (July 18,
2012), http://www.cls-group.com/MC/Pages/NewsArticle.aspx?nid=99.
285. See Table 19: Amounts Outstanding of Over-the-Counter (OTC) Derivatives,
BANKS FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS QUARTERLY REVIEw, May 8, 2013, at A141.
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significant monitoring, restrictive, and pricing capabilities.2 86 These measures are
currently largely unavailable to the Federal Reserve.
For example, in Reforming the International Monetary System, 287
economists suggest that a partial solution to global liquidity issues could be to
"systematize swap agreements between central banks,"2 88 with the IMF as a hub
institution. Their solution would also include ex ante codified agreements and
contracts for this potential ex post liquidity provision.29 The IMF would act as a
global liquidity supplier by "simultaneously entering into swap agreements with a
liquidity-issuing country and with a country in need of liquidity." 2 90 These swap
arrangements would act as an "insurance mechanism,"291 and sovereign liquidity
"insurers" would be compensated ex ante by insurance-like premiums. The IMF
would have the capability to select, monitor, and sanction individual sovereign
actors .292
Even if implemented, such multilateral solutions could ultimately be
untenable. Central banks providing high-demand reserve currencies-the liquidity
issuers-could breach their agreements ex post if their own country's interests
sufficiently incentivized such a decision. This risk is similar to that faced by a CCP
in the event that an individual clearinghouse member were to strategically breach a
contractual obligation-such as an ex ante agreement to make additional
contributions to the CCP default fund-during a financial crisis because such
action is in the institution's best interest. 293
Another way of thinking about the Federal Reserve's swap line hub
position or central role with its swap lines is to compare it to that of a CCP. 2 94
Similar to a CCP, the Federal Reserve is in the hub position within a network of
foreign central banks connected by swap lines. While truly global solutions might
be unlikely in the near future, they are helpful to inform expectations about the
responsibilities and capabilities of the "hub" institution. As noted, a foreseeable
future extension of the Federal Reserve's swap lines is to overseas CCPs.
286. See generally FARHI ET AL., supra note 22, at 36.
287. See id.
288. Id. § 4.4.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 39.
291. See id. at 36.
292. See id. at 37. It is unclear whether in practice the IMF would be in a position
to accomplish this.
293. See generally Ed Nosal, Clearing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 35 ECoN.
PERS., 4th Qtr., 2011, at 137 (discussing the possibility of strategic breach by a counterparty
in a bilateral relationship).
294. A CCP is a hub, and its clearing members-individual financial
institutions are "connected" by spokes. The primary purpose of the CCP hub is to
concentrate, mutualize, and robustly manage the credit risk of the clearing members'
financial transactions. Accordingly, CCPs require that clearing members meet stringent
financial standards, maintain margin accounts, make contributions to a common default
fund, and follow demanding risk-management procedures. For additional background on
CCPs, see NORMAN, supra note 278.
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Elsewhere, I have argued that the Federal Reserve has potentially become, in some
important respects, the central clearing party of last resort.2 95 If the Federal
Reserve were to establish swap lines with overseas CCPs, it could also become, in
some important respects, the international CCP of last resort. This is one reason
why a new legal framework incorporating such considerations is urgent.
To minimize moral hazard, international loan program facilities have long
conditioned the disbursement of funds on monitoring and financial restrictions. For
example, the IMF has a history of placing conditions on its loans.296 In fact, some
economically emerging countries are thought to have built up excess foreign
reserves to self-insure so as to avoid the potential strictures of such
conditionality.2 97 Many of the Federal Reserve's swap line counterparties are also
members of the IMF. Some are among its largest shareholders. Additionally, the
U.S. Treasury has placed conditions on its Exchange Stabilization Fund loans to
sovereigns.298 Therefore, conditionality or parallel measures in the use of the swap
lines as proposed by my framework should be unsurprising.
Current foreign central bank controversies also suggest the need for a new
swap line legal framework. Before some foreign central banks will act as
international lenders of last resort, they expect to have supervision and regulatory
authority over beneficiary institutions. This expectation is unsurprising given
traditional understandings of the lender of last resort role.2 99 A current example
illustrates this point: the ECB's "location policy" discussed above. This physical
"location policy" is designed to give European regulators the ability to oversee
risks to the euro. 3 00 Proponents of the policy argue that data access and cooperative
regulatory oversight fall short of the "direct supervision" that is necessary. 3 01 Of
course, the ECB could instead use the central banks in the foreign CCP
jurisdictions as supervision intermediaries. This is currently the practice in the case
of the Federal Reserve's swap lines.
A second possible objection to my proposed framework is that it would
jeopardize central bank independence. A central bank's independence is widely
295. See Baker, supra note 79.
296. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, FACTSHEET: IMF CONDITIONALITY 1-3, (Apr. 2,
2013).
297. See Mishkin, supra note 86.
298. Munk, supra note 116, at 229-233. Note that the Treasury's Exchange
Stabilization Fund, like the swap lines, was originally established to manage the value of the
dollar. Its continued existence has been controversial. See generally Calomiris, supra note
180.
299. See generally supra Part II(A)-(D).
300. Watt, supra note 202.
301. See id. (quoting Philippe Troussard at the Banque de France, who stated that
"[g]iven the growing systemic importance of CCPs, if a CCP clears a significant volume of
euro-denominated contracts, we feel it is vital for it to have access to eurozone central bank
liquidity in times of crisis. If eurozone central banks are going to provide liquidity to CCPs,
they will require direct oversight of these institutions, hence the request for such
infrastructures to be located within the eurozone. There will be no change from our side on
this matter.").
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acknowledged to be critical to its institutional effectiveness. As economist and
Federal Reserve historian Allan Meltzer explains: "Independence is not just
important. It is a critical part of the institutionalization of a low-inflation policy. It
prevents Congress and the administration from financing deficits by printing
money. And it avoids pressures for credit allocation to politically favored
,,302groups. As noted, the current swap line framework already creates questions
about central bank independence. My proposals arguably strengthen and reinforce
central bank independence.
Third, some opponents of my proposed framework could argue that the
Federal Reserve's swap lines should be completely abolished. One possible
argument for this is that the swap lines potentially conflict with the Constitution's
congressional appropriations process. The potential fiscal character of the swap
lines is problematic, but increased international financial market instability and its
possible domestic economic ramifications in their absence-at least in the short-
term-could also be highly problematic. In balancing these concerns, the current
use of the swap lines-and their likely future extension-is likely to be necessary
and to continue for the foreseeable future.
Finally, many economists and others view the Federal Reserve's swap
lines as having successfully provided critical international stability during the
financial crisis. Therefore, it could be argued that the status quo is unproblematic.
And furthermore, that if a new swap line framework were necessary, it would have
already been put into place, or at a minimum, a greater public demand would exist
for its creation. But a public choice explanation 3 03 could also explain why this
might not necessarily be the case. The Federal Reserve's swap lines are unfamiliar
to most, but it is eminently reasonable to suggest that much of the general public
would support the creation of legal frameworks designed to minimize or eliminate
provision of government insurance to international financial institutions. At the
same time, the potential benefits of the swap lines to international financial
institutions create strong incentives for powerful, well-organized financial market
interest groups to support the status quo, to strongly resist any additional
regulation or legal frameworks that could reduce or eliminate these benefits, and
even to argue for the future expansion of the swap lines' use.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the Federal Reserve's use of swap lines provided
important stability in international financial markets during the financial crisis. It
also argues that they will increasingly be critical international stability mechanisms
and that their use will likely expand. Although the use of swap lines among central
banks is relatively new, there are significant potential problems and risks
302. MELTZER, supra note 75, at 1252. See also Geoffrey Miller, An Interest-
Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 433, 445-57 (1998)
("Extensive research over the past decade tends to support the theory that central bank
independence is associated with lower inflation, at least in the developed world").
303. For a general primer on public choice theory, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS &
TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (1st ed. 2009).
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associated with the Federal Reserve's swap lines. The current statutory framework
is woefully inadequate to confront these challenges. Therefore, a new legal
framework for the Federal Reserve's swap lines is urgently needed. My Article
argues for a balanced approach. In sum, swap lines can be a significant aid in
fostering domestic and international financial market stability during financial
crises, but this objective cannot be reached unless and until the swap lines
themselves are grounded in a new, thoughtful, practical, and forward-looking legal
framework. Importantly, this new framework should be informed by future
developments surrounding central bank swap lines and their impending
transformational role in global financial markets.
